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A Dissertation

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with a

Major in Political Science

in the

College of Graduate Studies

University of Idaho

by

Micheal R. Fiedler

June 2000

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
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
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
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
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Abstract

The end of the cold war brought a rapid growth in the number of United Nation's peace operations, but difficult operations in Somalia and Bosnia soon led to a sharp retraction. New UN operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor may mark the beginning of a second surge in post-cold war peace operations. As peace operations have risen and fallen in repute, numerous studies have examined why they succeed or fail. Yet these studies offer wildly differing explanations because they are often based upon a limited number of cases bounded by a very brief time period. No attempt has been made to generalize across the entire period of peacekeeping operations. This study developed a theory that was used to form hypotheses explaining the relationship among various independent variables as they affect the likelihood of achieving success in peace operations. The variables believed to have an impact upon success were belligerent party consent, the type of conflict, geographic factors such as type of terrain, the degree of peace operation impartiality, the efficiency of command and control, adequacy of the force size, the quality of the mandate, and the degree of great power support. An empirical test was performed to analyze the hypothesized relationships. The analysis showed that the hypothesized relationships between the independent variables and dependent variable were in the proper direction, but many independent variables had no statistically significant effect. However, the level of consent of the belligerent parties and the quality of the mandate proved to have a significant impact upon the potential for success of peace operations. No other variables tested offered such a high explanatory power singly or combined. This has significant implications for the scholarly literature covering peace operations.

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I. Introduction

The number of United Nations (UN) peace operations has fluctuated greatly since the Security Council sent the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to supervise the 1948 truce in Palestine. In the forty-three year period between 1948-87, the UN deployed only 13 operations, but in the short nine-year period between 1988-1996, twenty-nine new missions began. In January 1988, 11,121 military, police and civilian personnel were deployed and the annual budget for peacekeeping was \$230.4 million. By December 1994, 77,783 personnel were deployed at an annual cost of \$3.6 billion (United Nations, 1996).

In addition to this quantitative change, UN peace operations underwent a qualitative change. During the Cold War, the vast majority of operations were traditional peace operations.¹ A traditional peace operation is conducted with the full consent of the parties involved in the conflict and only after a cease-fire has been achieved. In addition, the use of force by the operation is held to the minimum required for self-defense. After the end of the Cold War, peace operations were deployed primarily into areas of internal conflict and operated in much more complex domestic environments. These multidimensional operations went beyond straightforward military intercession between consenting belligerents. They were often comprised of both military and civilian components operating without the consent of the parties to the conflict, and sometimes included the rebuilding of disintegrated societies.

Dismal experiences with post-Cold War operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda

¹ Exceptions were the Congo operation (ONUC, 1960-64) and West New Guinea (UNSF, 1962-63). See Durch (1996, p. 3).

cooled international enthusiasm for peace operations, and only ten operations were set in motion after 1996. Today, the UN employs only 20,908 peace operations personnel.² The dark shadow of these failures led some to suggest the UN must "perform or perish" (Hirsh, 1999; Paris, 1997) as it carries out a new peace operation in East Timor and struggles with others in Africa (McClure and Orlov, 1999; Lynch, 1999; Hirsh, 1999).

Traditional peace operations during the Cold War were of an ad hoc nature, a style the UN continued as it became involved in the bitter protracted social conflicts and widespread humanitarian crises that increasingly characterized the post-Cold War international environment. Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and other difficult post-Cold War operations highlighted the inadequacy of ad hoc approaches and the lack of a theoretical framework more clearly than ever before. Yet scholars continue to disagree over a definition of success or the factors that contribute to successful peacekeeping.

I aim to develop a theory of peace operations that employs an effective definition of success and I isolate the variables that influence it. I then conduct a systematic empirical test of the hypothesis. My broader goal is to structure a theoretical base for additional research on the theory and practice of peace operations. By first following the development of peace operations from their embryonic stage to the present, I chart the major precedents and crises of peacekeeping.

² See <http://www.un.org/dpko>, and Brown (1999). In 1998, the last year for which peace operation expenses are available, the cost was \$870 million. Strength figures are based upon data from April 1999 – April 2000.

The Evolution of Peace Operations

There is no agreed Archimedean Point for the beginning of peace operations, but many scholars find the clearest prototype for present-day peacekeeping in the League of Nations. They often cite the arrangements made by the League to monitor the plebiscite that returned the Saar to Germany in 1935.³ As Lewis (1992) notes, “some 3,200 troops from Britain, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands, together with a police contingent, were sent under the command of a British general—but wearing their normal uniforms—to preserve law and order while the citizens of the Saar determined their future” (p. 35). Described as a peace force, they exercised impartiality, sought to avoid force, cooperated with civilian authorities, and relied upon patrolling to keep order, all characteristics of modern observation missions.⁴

The Charter of the United Nations did not include any mention of peace operations. The founders of the UN did include provisions that would enable the UN to respond to breaches of peace and security. Chapter VI of the Charter provided for peaceful means of dispute resolution, while Chapter VII made available forceful means. The member states agreed to put their armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council to enforce peace if need be.

The Cold War soon stifled any hope of the UN acting as the global policeman. However, the UN was quickly involved in a number of local disputes. Its first was the Special

³ Other operations cited include the international operation in Albania from 1913-14 (Schmidl, 1999). Also often cited is the League’s 1920 work in the city of Vilna, its 1921 operations with regard to the boundaries of Albania, or its 1925 fact-finding and observation mission regarding the crisis between Bulgaria and Greece. For a concise and informative review of the League’s use of peace operations, see James (1999, p. 154-160).

⁴ See Chopra (in Weiss, 1995, p. 73) for more on the League operation in the Saar.

Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) established by the UN on October 21, 1947.⁵

UNSCOB was deployed to investigate the Greek government's charges of outside support from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria for communist insurgents in the Greek Civil war. The UN terminated the operation in late 1951 at Greece's request.

In August 1947 the Security Council established a Good Offices Commission (GOC) with a team of military assistants as observers in hopes of ending the fighting that began after Indonesia sought to break free from the Netherlands and establish its independence. Reconstituted as the United Nations Mission for Indonesia (UNCI) in 1949, the operation was tasked with ceasefire implementation and observation and assisting with the repatriation of the Netherlands army. UNCI remained in existence until 1951.⁶ UNSCOB and GOC, while authorized by the UN, were not under the operational control of the Security Council or the Secretary General. Consequently, the UN does not officially consider them peace operations.

The Traditional Period: 1948-1988

The traditional period was characterized by operations mandated under measures for peaceful resolution of conflict under Chapter VI of the UN Charter rather than the enforcement measures in Chapter VII. During this period, three tenets of peace operations emerged. First, in deference to sovereignty, operations needed the consent of the parties involved in the conflict prior to deployment. Second, the parties had to perceive the operation as an impartial player in the conflict. And finally, the operation had to use the minimum amount of force required for self-defense.

⁵ For an evaluation of UNSCOB, see Birgisson (in Durch, 1993b, pp. 77-83).

⁶ For more on GOC and its derivative, UNCI, see Rikhye et al. (1974, pp. 138-143).

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), as the first undertaking unambiguously under the control of the Secretary-General, was the first official peace operation. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria attacked Israel on 15 May 1948, one day after the Jewish Agency proclaimed Israel a state. UNTSO consisted of unarmed military observers sent to Palestine to supervise the truce and subsequent cease-fire.⁷ A similar observation group, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), was deployed to Kashmir in 1949 after India and Pakistan disputed control of the territory. The observers for these missions were unarmed, gained the consent of the belligerent parties, and were impartial. These tenets characterized the traditional period.

The deployment of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) marked the start of a period of somewhat larger and more complex operations in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus. Tensions along Israel's borders with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were increasing in 1956. Fedayeen raids increased from Sinai and Gaza into Israel, while Egypt closed the Suez and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli use. In July, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal after the U.S. cancelled funding for the Aswan High Dam.

Israel, Britain, and France colluded on a plan for an attack of Egypt. Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, and at dusk on 31 October, a Franco-British air offensive began. The Security Council was paralyzed in responding because Britain and France, both permanent members, had veto power over any course of action. The matter was transferred to the General Assembly, and on 4 November, the General Assembly asked Secretary-General

⁷ After the 1967 war, neither Israel nor Egypt would accept UNTSO observers from nations perceived to have armed and supported its opponent. This ruled out the superpowers or

Hammarskjöld to negotiate a cease-fire and deploy a UN force to supervise Israeli, British, and French withdrawal. UNEF I withdrew on 16 May 1967 upon Egypt's request, and another Arab-Israeli war began soon thereafter. As the first armed peace operation, UNEF I was an important precedent for later operations.

In 1958, the UN began a long history of peacekeeping involving Lebanon when it deployed the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). It was tasked with investigating complaints that the United Arab Republic, as Egypt and Syria were then called, was infiltrating guerillas into Lebanon. UNOGIL found that no infiltration of consequence was taking place. The election of a new Lebanese president stabilized the internal situation and UNOGIL was disbanded.

The largest, costliest, and most complicated operation for its time was the United Nations Operation in the Former Belgian Congo (ONUC). Belgium granted Congo its independence in 1960. Within days, the army mutinied, law and order deteriorated, and Belgium sent troops back in to protect its citizens. Katanga, a province which generated 80 percent of Congo's export revenue and half its total income, seceded under Moise Tshombe. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the UN for help.

ONUC grew increasingly controversial, as it had to deal not only with Katanga's succession but also with a civil war between the pro-western forces of President Kasavubu and the pro-Moscow forces of Prime Minister Lumumba. The operation was characterized by severe great power friction over their expectations for the operation and acute financial problems that nearly bankrupted the UN, all in the context of a succession and violent civil

active NATO or Warsaw Pact members, another development in the tenet of impartiality. See Hillen (1998, p. 41).

war with resulting civilian hardship. The operation finally withdrew in June 1964 after helping hold the Congo together, but the price was high. The UN had intervened directly for the first time in a chaotic internal crisis, and was traumatized by the experience.⁸

After its bitter experience in the Congo, the UN approved only smaller operations between 1962 and 1964. In 1962, the UN dispatched the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to help the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) administer West New Guinea (West Irian) as the Dutch handed over the colony to Indonesia. In 1963 UN observers went to Yemen as the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) to oversee a fragile cease-fire between royalists and republicans and the disengagement of outside states from the conflict. Peacekeeping had survived the Congo.

The year 1964 saw the beginning of another UN mission forced to work in a difficult and complex environment. A civil war erupted in Cyprus in 1963 between the Greek majority and Turkish minority inhabitants. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was launched amid fears that the two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey, would be drawn into the conflict. Its goals, to prevent further escalation and return the status quo, were at first met by the UN constabulary force.

The UN role on the island changed significantly in 1974. Turkey invaded the island following a coup against the Cypriot government by a group of Cypriot National Guard officers encouraged by the Greek military dictatorship. By the time a cease-fire was arranged, the Turks controlled the northern forty percent of Cyprus. UNFICYP began monitoring the

⁸ Although there are a variety of works on the UN involvement in the Congo, a few stand out. For an excellent overview of ONUC, see Durch (in Durch, 1993b, pp. 315-352). For an eyewitness account, see Urquhart (1987, pp. 145-188).

cease-fire by deploying observers on either side of the "Green Line" which now splits the island into two separate communities; a role it still fulfills.

In 1965, the UN deployed two relatively uncomplicated operations of short duration. The Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) was sent to observe the civil strife in that country after America's military intervention to protect US citizens and to block a leftist government from assuming power. The United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was also deployed in 1965 to augment UNMOGIP by monitoring the India-Pakistan border outside the state of Jammu-Kashmir after fighting broke out between the two states over the Rann of Kutch.

Reflecting the tension of the cold war, no new operation was launched by the UN between 1967 and late 1973. The joint Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel on October 6 1973 disturbed the tranquility. Syrian forces broke through to the Golan Heights while Egyptian forces pressed deep into the Sinai, but an Israeli counterattack surrounded the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai and crossed the Suez Canal to menace Port Said. An unsupervised cease-fire sponsored by the U.S. and Soviet Union in the Security Council failed and increasing tensions nearly led to a direct Middle East superpower confrontation.

Yugoslavia and the nonaligned members of the Security Council demanded a force to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces. The initiative led to the creation of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), which operated from 1973 until 1979 as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal. In 1974, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was dispatched to carry out buffer duties between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights. UNDOF continues today.

In 1978, the Israeli army crossed the border into Lebanon, occupying much of the southern portion of that state, in response to continued use by the Palestine Liberation Organization of the region as a basing area for attacks on Israel. The U.S., eager to salvage the Camp David talks and keep Soviet influence at bay, proposed the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to oversee Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel opposed the force and continued to maintain a security zone in the south.

UNIFIL had to step aside when Israel again invaded Lebanon in 1982 and was humiliated when Israeli armored columns drove through its roadblocks enroute to punish Hezbollah guerilla groups. The operation demonstrated to the UN the need “for the Security Council to satisfy itself that conditions exist for successful peacekeeping before taking the decision to set up a new operation” (Goulding, 1993, p. 453). It took until May 23, 2000 for the Israeli force to begin to withdraw.

The thirteen UN Chapter VI operations established during the traditional period (five remain in existence) fostered the gradual evolution of tenets for peace operations. UNTSO began the pattern by demonstrating the need for minimum force, the consent of the parties, and the impression of impartiality. The 1967 withdrawal of UNEF I upon Egypt’s request and the subsequent Arab-Israeli war further emphasized the need for consent, while ONUC, UNFICYP, and later, UNIFIL, drove home the importance of all three. With the notable exceptions of ONUC and UNYOM, they all were mandated to monitor borders, verify ceasefires or oversee separation of forces. These tenets of peace operations came to constitute a growing body of customary practice that was on the whole accepted by all concerned.

The Transition Period

The UN did not launch even one peace operation for the ten-year period from 1978 to 1988. The beginning of the end of the cold war, however, opened up new opportunities. A positive attitude emerged in the USSR toward UN peace operations, and a new spirit of cooperation emerged between Moscow and Washington toward resolving the regional conflicts originating in the East-West politics of the cold war. Ever more ambitious goals were set for peace operations as mandates began to expand to include new duties.

In 1988, the UN sent a fifty-man contingent to monitor the Soviet army withdrawal from Afghanistan as the Soviet Union ended its painful occupation of that state. In the first peace operation in the Western Hemisphere, the UN established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in 1989. Supported by the great powers, its mandate was to monitor the agreement between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua to cease aid for guerrilla groups in the area as well as helping with the voluntary disarming of the Nicaraguan contra forces.

That same year, the UN launched the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), an observer team charged with monitoring Cuba's withdrawal from Angola as it ended its help to the nominally Marxist government there against the South African-backed UNITA rebels. South Africa agreed in turn to give independence to Namibia, and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) began a sophisticated yearlong operation to disarm the SWAPO guerillas, monitor the local police, and confine the army to barracks while it supervised Namibia's first free elections.

With the exception of Afghanistan, these operations mandated a range of activities that went well beyond observation of an agreement. Support for disarmament, demobilization and

demining, monitoring of human rights, assisting with elections, resettlement of refugees, and development of national police forces were all now a part of UN mandates. UN peace operations were becoming multidimensional, and the perceived success of these efforts led to an increased optimism about the efficacy of the UN as a post-cold war conflict manager.

The Period of Unbridled Optimism

Unprecedented great power cohesion during and after the 1991 Gulf War provided the backdrop for the growing confidence of world leaders in UN peace operations. In 1991, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was charged with organizing and conducting the referendum to choose between independence or joining Morocco. That same year, UNIKOM was established to monitor the buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait.

World leaders at the first Security Council Summit articulated this confidence in January 1992 by calling for improved and more frequent use of peace operations. Tasked by these leaders to develop a plan, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace in 1992 amplified the call for a more assertive approach by the UN. Subsequently, the UN's 1992 large-scale operations in Mozambique, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia were accompanied by a large expansion in the tasks assigned.

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established in 1992 at the conclusion of a civil war that began in 1980. A General Peace Agreement had been signed in Rome on 4 October 1992, and the country's first multiparty elections were held in October 1994. Following the formation of a government ONUMOZ's mandate terminated and the mission ended in January 1995.

In September 1993, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was ineffective in implementing the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement signed by the Haitian parties

on 3 July 1993. In October 1994, the Security Council authorized a multinational force led by the United States. The Haitian Constitutional Government was restored and UNMIH was brought back to life. The Security Council's new mandate called for it to assist the democratic Government of Haiti with restoring the Haitian armed forces, to create a separate police force, and to assist with the 1995 legislative and presidential elections.

Building on the increased complexity of operations demonstrated in Angola, Namibia, Western Sahara, Mozambique, and Haiti, the large UN force established in 1992 as the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in Cambodia received an extremely complex mandate. It called for completion of a multitude of tasks ranging from protection and monitoring of human rights to organizing and conducting free elections. UNTAC was a major development for UN peace operations; nothing on its scale and complexity had ever been attempted.⁹ After a difficult and controversial operation leading to elections in May 1993, UNTAC ended in September 1993.

When Somalia's government toppled in 1991, the country collapsed into anarchy. The 1992 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) failed to provide security and escort for humanitarian supplies. In late 1992, a U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) replaced it and established safe zones for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.¹⁰ Unhappily, the U.S. and the UN disagreed over whether UNITAF was required to disarm the factions, an

⁹ Durch (1996, p. 172) calls the UNTAC mandate "breathtakingly ambitious."

¹⁰ UNITAF was authorized by the UN, but was not under its command or control. Consequently, it is not considered a UN peace operation, but rather a "contract" operation.

argument that hindered the transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II in May 1993.¹¹ In addition, although it was mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter, UNISOM II was not provided the means to use force. The death of eighteen U.S. servicemen triggered the withdrawal of U.S. forces supporting UNISOM II in March 1994 and led to the total withdrawal of the mission.

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 grew from a medium-sized Chapter VI protection operation for humanitarian purposes into a major Chapter VII military enforcement operation with no-fly zones, safe areas, and other nonconsensual schemes for conflict management.¹² Durch (1996) has called the Bosnia operation “the most complex and frustrating operation ever undertaken by the United Nations, Somalia included” (p. 232). The 1995 Dayton Agreement finally called for an end to the conflict and the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) took over operations.

Nearly all the operations in this period were established to deal with internal conflicts, often involving humanitarian and human rights crises. In several cases, notably the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti, belligerent party consent for the operation was absent or

¹¹ The UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali felt the U.S. failed to live up to its mandate by not disarming the factions or spreading its operation to the entire country in UNITAF. In turn, the U.S. accused the UN of engaging in wishful thinking regarding UNITAF disarmament of local factions and accused UNISOM II of not being prepared to accept the mission from UNITAF.

¹² After a long and difficult three years, the 1995 peace operation in Croatia could do little but watch as Croatian forces drove through their outposts to attack Serb positions in Croatia and then the entire Krajina region. UNPROFOR in Bosnia was responsible for escorting humanitarian aid, protecting safe areas, and implementing weapons exclusion zones, but it found that its presence in the middle of an active war zone made attaining these goals impossible. In Macedonia, UNPREDEP provided a buffer against the possibility that conflict might cross its borders.

nominal. The prohibition against the use of force except for self-defense gave way to operations engaged in irregular warfare with guerrillas and the occasional use of airpower to coerce. The use of regional and sub-regional organizations such as NATO in Bosnia and the OAS in Haiti increased markedly during this period.

A Period of Retraction

Starting in 1994, the perceived failure of UNISOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia resulted in a marked downturn in enthusiasm for peace operations in general and especially for large complex operations in which the UN could become involved in local conflicts. The number of new operations fell off precipitously. The UN Secretariat set about to reorganize to improve its peace operation capabilities. In January 1995, the UN issued a Supplement to the Agenda for Peace. Largely a retraction of the aggressive proposals in the Agenda for Peace, it called for peace operations authorized by the Security Council but in the form of coalitions led by major powers.

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda provided startlingly clear evidence of the reluctance of the great powers to reengage in civil wars and the growing reliance of the UN on major powers. From 1990 until 1993, the Rwandan government and its primarily Hutu militia fought a sporadic civil war with the largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). UN involvement began with deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in June 1993 to verify that no military goods crossed the Rwanda-Uganda border. The commitment grew in October 1993 with deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) tasked to implement a peace settlement.

The reconciliation process broke down in April 1994 as extremist Hutu officials attempted to gain power. The civil war reignited, beginning a three-month period of genocide that killed an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsi civilians and forced 4.7 million to flee (Durch, 1996: 367). UNAMIR was for the most part withdrawn, but as the extent of the humanitarian disaster became known, the Security Council in May 1994 authorized an expanded UNAMIR II to better protect civilians.¹³ UN member states refused to support UNAMIR II with troop and equipment contributions and France stepped in with Operation Turquoise to provide safe areas for civilians. Unfortunately, by the time UNAMIR II was deployed, the genocide had ended; UNAMIR withdrew in 1996.

The period 1995 to 1998 reflected continued UN caution concerning peace operations. No new missions were authorized, although several ongoing operations were reorganized, including Angola (UNAVEM III), and the former Yugoslavia where UNPROFOR was restructured into separate commands, one for Croatia (UNCRO), Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and Macedonia (UNPREDEP). UNCRO was in turn replaced in 1996 by UNMOP which was mandated to monitor demilitarization of the strategically important Prevlaka peninsula.

In January 1996, the UN authorized an operation within Croatia by creating the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). Mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council authorized the

¹³ A French peacekeeping effort called Operation Turquoise was authorized by the Security Council to use “all means necessary” to protect the civilian population in Rwanda. It provided safe areas for civilian population, but its neutrality and legitimacy were compromised by its former colonial role and perceptions of support for one of the parties.

operation to help the parties implement a 1995 agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities calling for the hand-over of the Danubian region of Eastern Slovonia, the last Serb-held territory in Croatia. UNTAES was mandated for twelve months, but was extended until 15 January 1998.¹⁴

The Security Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) on 28 June 1996 to continue the work of UNMIH by supporting the Haitian National Police (HNP). Its mandate was extended until 31 July 1997, when the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), the third of four UN peace operations in Haiti, was established by the Security Council to continue supporting the HNP. Finally, MIPONUH was mandated as the fourth peace operation, replacing UNTMIH in 1997. Unlike the three previous missions, MIPONUH had no military component, but supported the Haitian National Police until it completed its mandate on 15 March 2000.

In 1997, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) deployed military observers as a peace observation mission within the larger MINUGUA humanitarian mission. The purpose of the small observer component was verification of the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), including observation of a formal cessation of hostilities, the separation of forces, and the demobilization of URNG combatants in assembly points.

The Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) as a follow-on mission to replace UNAVEM III in Angola. MONUA was tasked with helping the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of

¹⁴ For a concise review of the UNTAES operation, see Šimunović (1999, pp. 126-142).

Angola (UNITA) complete the remaining political and military aspects of the peace process and discourage their use of force.

In 1998, only three operations were approved. The first, the United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG), took over monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region on 16 January 1998 from the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAES) after that mission's mandate had expired. It completed its work that same year.

MINURCA was established in the Central African Republic as the Security Council became concerned over increasing tensions and violence (especially in Bangui) as the country approached presidential elections. MINURCA was tasked with support of the elections, monitoring the restructuring of the national police and special police forces, assisting with disarmament, and establishing peace and security, especially in the area of Bangui and the immediate vicinity.

A civil war in Sierra Leone between the government and members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) set the stage for the deployment of UNOMSIL in June 1998. The mission monitored and advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. UNOMSIL also documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians. Government and rebel negotiations in 1999 led to an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and to form a government of national unity. UNOMSIL was expanded, but resurgence of the civil war in April 2000 with the capture of over 500 UNOMSIL troops has placed the operation in jeopardy.

Following the example of 1998, only three missions were authorized in 1999. After NATO's Operation Allied Force victory over Serbia, the UN became for all intents and purposes the sovereign authority in Kosovo (Lippman, 1999). The United Nations Interim

Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including all legislative and executive powers, as well as the management of the judiciary. The goal is substantial autonomy and self-government.

Indonesian acquiescence to international forces in East Timor in the wake of militia terror campaigns against the East Timorese led the UN to turn once again to authorization of a multinational force, this time led by Australia, to enforce peace. The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to provide security and maintain law and order. The Council later authorized deployment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), a UN commanded operation also authorized under Chapter VII, to replace INTERFET.

After the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, the Security Council set up MONUC on 30 November 1999 to maintain liaison with the parties and carry out other tasks. On 24 February 2000, the Council passed Resolution 1291 (2000) under Chapter VII, substantially expanding the mission's mandate and size. However, the resumption of civil war in Sierra Leone and renewed hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia has increased the apprehension of UN member states concerning another potentially difficult operation in Africa.

The development of UN peace operations has been an ad hoc "learn as you go" evolution. Pre-1988 peace operations were characterized by reliance upon themes of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force, and were deployed as interdisposition forces between previously warring parties. As the cold war drew to a close, a spirit of optimism ensued, as complex UN peace operations that had deployed into areas of minimal consent appeared to be successful. The Gulf War, which seemed to mark an emerging era of great power

cooperation, cemented this impression, an impression to be dashed upon the reality of Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. UN peace operations entered a period of decline, as new operations became scarce, often following intervention by a regional or sub-regional coalition. Even now as the UN is taking tentative steps to redefine its role in peace operations, events in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are calling into question the efficacy of UN efforts.

The literature investigating peace operations began to appear as early as 1949, but the recent growth and subsequent decline in peace operations sparked renewed interest in the subject. However, the literature is consistently vague and unsystematic, with little development of theory using hypothesis testing. Several trends in the evolution of the literature actually hinder systematic analysis.

First, analysts either continue to label all international effort to resolve conflict “peacekeeping” or create their own typology, leading to what Diehl characterizes a “conceptual muddle” of terms (Diehl, 1994). I will use the term “peace operations” to describe the entire range of UN activities attempting to defuse and resolve international conflicts, including:¹⁵

1. Preventive diplomacy—action to prevent disputes from arising, to prevent existing disputes from escalating, or to limit the spread of conflict if it does break out.

¹⁵ The term peace operations was used by President Clinton in Presidential Decision Directive on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25), see Joint Warfighting Center (1997, p. A-1). Other definitions summarize those given by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace and his 1995 Supplement To An Agenda For Peace.

2. Peacemaking—action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means. Peacemaking is often a prelude to peacekeeping.
3. Peacekeeping—the deployment of a UN presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned.
4. Peace enforcement—a coercive measure and thus, by definition, not requiring the consent of the parties concerned.

Second, the standard analysis of peace operations remains either a single case study (i.e., Kaloudis, 1999; Rose, 1996; Farris, 1994; Heininger, 1994) or the comparison of a few cases, with intent of deriving “lessons learned” (i.e., Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, 1974; Diehl, 1994).¹⁶ The case study approach provides insight into success or failure in specific operations like the Congo, Somalia, Bosnia or Namibia, but does not permit generalizations to be drawn across cases.

These studies also tend to fail in systematically defining success or identifying the factors that can lead to it. Many analysts provide no definition of success at all, others rely upon single criterion to define success, and still others apply multiple criteria that are

¹⁶ There have been a few systematic attempts to analyze peripheral aspects of peace operations, but none focusing on why peace operations succeed or fail. Pelcovits and Kramer (1976) use CASCON, a computerized data set, to discover what motivated UN intervention in a local conflict, while Diehl et al. (1998) use statistical analysis to develop a typology of mission types, and Harff and Gurr (1998) analyze the applicability of conflict models as early warning indicators for humanitarian emergencies. None of these models attack the question of which factors could affect success. Manwaring and Fishel (1992) test 72 variables that could contribute to success and failure in insurgencies, and arrived at seven indexes. Their model (later nonsystematically applied as the so-called “Manwaring Paradigm,” i.e., Fishel, 1998) is a positive move toward a more systematic approach, but has several weaknesses, one of which is a lack of a standardized definition of success.

excessively narrow or applicable to only a few cases.¹⁷ As the UN and its member states consider a new surge of peace operations, a systematic conceptual definition of success capable of providing an “objective standard” (Bratt, in Pugh, 1997) is essential for evaluating the performance of past peace operations. Yet determining the outcome of past operations is not the only ingredient needed to develop a solid theoretical framework for peace operations. It is only by discovering what factors cause peace operations to succeed or fail that we are able to move beyond the confusion of ad hoc methods of peace operations to development of an effective theory. Determination of these factors is the critical empirical link between experience and theory.

Development of an effective theoretical base may also support policymakers who must make decisions regarding the effective use of peace operations. Avoiding deployment of operations into inappropriate scenarios would save the vast human and material resources involved in a fruitless intervention. On the other hand, knowing which situations are conducive to intervention may encourage appropriate missions that could avoid the terrible human and material costs associated with inaction. In addition, knowing how to maximize the chances for success in the peace operations in which we do engage can only increase the potential for reaching international objectives at the least cost.¹⁸

¹⁷ A.B. Fetherston (1994) is correct when he states, “A significant problem exists with how ‘success’ is defined” (p. 43).

¹⁸ Some suggest any motive for intervention is misplaced, as peace operations are not an effective tool (Copley, 1997; Krauthammer, 1995; Luttwak, 1995, 1999). They suggest UN intervention cripples “the peacemaking potential of war” by delaying resolution (Luttwak, 1999, p. 38). Most researchers suggest that indifference to human rights violations is impossible for the international community and abstention is not an option (Skjelsbaek, 1989;

Chapter Outline

Much of the confusion in current peace operation practice results from the lack of development of a theoretical base underpinned by hypothesis and testing, a lacuna I satisfy in this study. Accordingly, I first provide a foundation by analyzing the legal and moral implications of UN peace operations. In chapter three, I provide a theory of peace operations. In chapter four, I detail the dependent and independent variables and provide a methodology to test the hypothesis. I summarize my empirical findings in chapter five. In six, I apply the analytical framework in a prognostic manner to the evolving Congo operation and offer conclusions in chapter seven.

James, 1995; McClure and Orlov, 1999; Hunt, 1994; Jentleson, quoted in Whitelaw, 1999). They suggest that “giving war a chance” is a risky and costly road to peace.

II. Legal And Moral Aspects Of Peace Operations

After the cold war, the nature of conflict changed.¹⁹ Between 1989 and 1994, only four of the ninety-three armed conflicts in the world were between states. The rest were within states.²⁰ These conflicts, often motivated by ancient hatreds and ethnic conflict within states, have led to new problems. In 1993, more than twenty-five million refugees fled across borders seeking protection from human rights violations. The problem shows no signs of slowing down. In 1995, 292 minority groups were revolting against the governments controlling them (Gurr, 1995). Intrastate conflict may well predominate for some time to come.

The most fundamental debate regarding UN peace operations concerns the primacy of state sovereignty versus the right of the UN to intervene in these domestic conflicts (Righter, 1995; Mingst and Karns, 1995; Higgins, 1995). Given the intrastate nature of conflict in the post-cold war era, this debate has serious implications for peace operations.

The Charter of the United Nations was based upon the conception of absolute sovereignty of the state. Nevertheless, there is an evolving notion that individual human rights exist prior to state's rights to total sovereignty and in fact justify sovereignty. This means that

¹⁹ Sinai (1995) states, "In the 1990s, although the prospect for global war, particularly nuclear confrontation, between superpowers has greatly diminished, the number of regional conflicts and conflicts within states (or fragmented former states), has increased" (p. 5). Minear (in Weiss, 1995), noting the rise of ethnic and religious conflict that had been pent up by the cold war, observes "Intrastate conflicts have now replaced superpower jousting as the major complication in the life of the United Nations" (p. 90). Weiss (1995) states, "The removal of East-West tensions coincided with the beginning of a period of growing intrastate violence, a brutal expression of historical grievances and ethnonationalism" (p. 195).

²⁰ This figure, quoted from Kegley (1996, p. 37) is from the Stockholm International Peace Institute.

individual rights “trump” those of the state. This has led to perplexing questions about the role of the UN in guaranteeing such rights.

Does the UN also have the moral right, or perhaps even the duty, to intervene on the basis of protection of human rights? Does protection of human rights override the traditional norm of nonintervention? Is there justification for such intrusions upon a state’s sovereignty? If so, what is the justification for international organizations to use force to relieve human suffering and protect human rights without the express permission of the state? Finally, which rights violations furnish justification for intervention, and can the UN intervene in one country when it refuses to do so in another? This is a debate that follows two avenues: the legal aspects of UN intervention and the moral aspect of UN intervention.

This chapter examines the legal implications by briefly reviewing the evolution of international organizations, culminating in the United Nations Charter, its provisions for intervention, and the dilemma it leaves between sovereignty and intervention. Following that is a discussion of possible moral justifications for intervention that may be considered within the limits of the UN Charter.

Legal Aspects

The roots of the UN run deep. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), an early Dutch legal scholar, contributed a number of basic principles that serve as the foundation for both modern international law and for many of the concepts behind international organizations. He viewed states as “rational and law-abiding entities capable of achieving cooperative goals” while being restricted from doing whatever they wished in the international arena by the rule of law (Mingst & Karns, 1995, pp. 15-16). Countering this Grotian tradition was the notion of state

sovereignty within its borders. This concept, best expressed within the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, gives states exclusive governing authority within their own territorial limits. The seeds of the contradiction between sovereignty as the foundation of an international order versus limits on intra-state behavior were planted.

The evolution of international organizations began to take shape in a very elementary way in nineteenth-century international politics. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna initiated a system of multi-lateral great power political conferences that evolved into the Concert of Europe, which met some thirty times prior to World War I. Although smaller powers were occasionally invited to attend, these conferences were clearly a reinforcement of the hegemony of great powers unwilling to sacrifice their national interests in favor of community interests. It did, however, establish a model of a council of great powers that exists in the UN today (Claude, 1971).

Two International Peace Conferences, initiated by Czar Nicholas II of Russia and held in 1899 and 1907 at the Hague in the Netherlands, became known as the Hague System. The first conference was attended by twenty-six, mostly European states. The second began a trend toward universality by including forty-four delegates with a much broader geographic representation. The implications of the Hague System extended beyond universality. The Hague System also implied the acceptance of the small states on equal terms with the great powers, as well as the creation of agencies that would be permanently at the disposal of states (Claude, 1971). Like the Concert of Europe, the Hague System was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I.

If these years are what Claude (1971, p. 41) calls “the era of preparation for international organization,” then the years since the beginning of World War I are the era of

its establishment. The League of Nations, established in the 1919 Versailles Treaty ending World War I, was designed to maintain the postwar status quo by controlling conflict in the aftermath of World War I.²¹ The League was based upon two fundamental principles: (1) member states agreed to respect the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of states; and (2) every war or threatened war was of interest to the whole League (Bennett, 1995, p. 28). The League's most important goal was promoting peace and preventing wars, which it attempted through an Assembly of all members. The Assembly was a Council of four permanent and four elected members, and a Secretariat of international civil servants to support the League's activities.²² Enforcement of League decisions was to be provided for by collective sanctions against the offending state.

Although the League successfully handled a Greek-Bulgarian border dispute in 1925, it was ineffective in responding to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Sanctions applied against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 were also insufficient. The League refused to increase the severity of the sanctions against Italy and subsequently abandoned them in 1936. From this point on, the effectiveness of League response to aggression deteriorated. It failed to respond to German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Spanish Civil War, and Japan's 1937 invasion of China. The use of the League as an international tool for gaining peace and cooperation met head-to-head with the lack of will of

²¹ Although the Covenant of the League of Nations was approved April 28, 1919 as a part of the Treaty of Versailles, the official beginning of the organization was delayed until the Treaty was ratified January 10, 1920 (Bennett, 1995, p. 27).

²² The Council was intended to consist of five permanent and four elected members, but U.S. refusal to join the League left a balanced Council with four of each (Bennett, 1995, p. 31).

member states to intercede in defending independent sovereign states under attack. Yet its concepts and institutions are the parentage of much of what the UN is today.

Just as World War I led to the League of Nations, World War II led to the UN. As early as October 1943 at a meeting in Moscow, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China expressed their desire for a postwar international organization (Claude, 1971). When the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations began on August 21, 1943, the real work began. This work continued at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and concluded in San Francisco in April 1945 with the completion of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In June 1945, the Charter was signed, and the first session of the General Assembly was held in London on January 10, 1946.

Articles 1 & 2 of the United Nations Charter established three principles that are the foundation of UN action. The first, listed in Article 1, states that the UN, like the League before it, is dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. Second, Article 2 specifies that the UN be “based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members” (Bennett, 1995, p. 465). Regardless of size or wealth, each state is legally the equivalent of every other state. Finally, the third principle is embedded in Article 2, which declares, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”²³ The UN Charter

²³ The Article continues, “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” (Bennett, 1995, p. 468), a point this study will address shortly.

was written with absolute state sovereignty in mind. Its focus was on interstate wars and its provisions were designed to deal with those conflicts.²⁴

The Charter also makes restrained reference to human rights. Articles 1 and 55 mention “respect for the principle of equal rights,” but it was only briefly discussed at San Francisco.²⁵ The major powers were not supportive and “emphasized the reservation on Article 2 as an important restraint on UN involvement in human rights” (Schachter, 1994, p. 17). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, attempted to fill this void by covering a very wide range of economic, social, and cultural rights as well as traditional civil and political rights.

While legally nonbinding, the Declaration still had substantial impact. It led to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with its Optional Protocol, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its Optional Protocol, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were passed by the General Assembly in 1966 and ratified in 1976.²⁶ Other treaties have supplemented these more general covenants.

²⁴ Thakur (in Thakur & Thayer, 1995) states, “The United Nations was designed to cope with inter-state war. Founded on the principle of national sovereignty, it is ill-equipped to cope with civil conflict” (pp. 9-10). Alvarez (1995) agrees that the Charter was designed to prohibit interstate aggression.

²⁵ Bennett (1995) states, “The language of the Charter with regard to human rights was so general that it lacked specific definition and content” (p. 396). Keith (1999) calls Charter references to human rights “rather infrequent and vague...largely promotional or programmatic in character” (p. 96).

²⁶ The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been accepted by more than two-thirds of UN members; less than half have accepted the Optional Covenant (Bennett, 1995, p. 397).

The UN, like the League, is organized around a Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretariat.²⁷ The Security Council consists of five permanent members, the United States, Great Britain, China, France, and Russia (Article 23). Each of these permanent members has veto power over any nonprocedural matter voted upon by the Council (Article 27).²⁸ The nonpermanent members, six in number until increased to ten in 1965, are elected in groups of five every two years by the General Assembly (Article 23). The Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security (Article 24).²⁹

Two key chapters of the Charter provide the legal authority for the Council to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” seeks to resolve disputes by peaceful means. It calls upon the parties to any dispute that may disrupt peace and security to “first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Bennett, 1995, p. 476). Accordingly, Article 34 gives the Security Council the right to investigate any dispute or situation that may lead to

²⁷ There are actually six principal organs of the UN: the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council in addition to the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat noted above. The first three have little role in peace operations (Bennett, 1995, pp. 62-76).

²⁸ Claude (1971) suggests the veto was meant to safeguard against great power dictatorship (p. 74) and to avoid the non-membership of one or more great powers (p. 146).

²⁹ Article 24 reads, in part: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (Bennett, 1995, p. 474).

conflict and “endanger international peace and security,” while Articles 33 and 36-38 direct the Council to recommend peaceful means of settlement.

If peaceful means fail to maintain or restore international peace and security, then Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” gives the Council the additional authority. First, Article 39 tasks the Council with “determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and instructs it to make recommendations or to decide what action to take under Articles 41 and 42 to maintain peace and security (Bennett, 1995, p. 477).

Article 40 gives the Council the power to call upon the parties to a conflict to take provisional measures to avoid exacerbation of the situation while it determines the recommendations or decisions it deems appropriate for resolving the conflict. Article 41 allows the Council to consider coercive options not involving the use of force, such as sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations, while Article 42 provides for use of various levels of force if the measures under Article 41 are inappropriate or inadequate to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security (Bennett, 1995, p. 478).

The Charter foresaw the establishment of a Military Staff Committee (Article 47) to advise the Security Council on military matters, and a military force (Articles 43, 44, 45) to carry out its measures.³⁰ Under Article 25, UN members “agree to accept and carry out the

³⁰ The UN Charter specifies that the Military Staff Committee is to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives (Bennett, 1995, pp. 479). This committee has been formed but is largely ineffective. The Article 43 requirement that members make available troops to be used in UN enforcement action has never come into being, a casualty of superpower disagreement over details of the plans. Since the end of the cold war, there have been numerous calls for readdressing Article 43, some

decisions of the Security Council" (Bennett, 1995, pp. 474) implying their responsibility to provide forces for military action is decided upon by the Council.

These Chapter VII Articles constitute the heart of UN collective security. Its deterrent effect is gained by convincing potential aggressors that the resources of the entire community would be mobilized against any abuse of power. As Claude (1971) reports, "whoever commits aggression is everybody's enemy" (p. 255). Collective security would render unilateral use of force unnecessary except in self-defense, and even that was to be monitored by the Security Council (Article 51).

In the General Assembly, every member state is represented under the one "state—one vote" formula. The General Assembly is the hub of debate. It conducts the elective functions of the UN, and, like the Security Council, has responsibilities for peace and security in that the General Assembly can make inquiries that might trigger further action (Articles 13, 14) and is to be kept informed of ongoing situations (Articles 10, 11, 12).

While the Security Council has primary responsibility for peace and security, the General Assembly has secondary responsibility. On the basis of the General Assembly's right to consider any matter within the purview of the Charter (Article 10), the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" passed during the Korean War in 1950 allows the General Assembly to act when the Security Council is deadlocked by great power veto. In addition, the General Assembly is tasked with deciding financial matters, and as such, approves budgets for peace operations.

Full-time international civil servants staff the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General has several duties under the Charter in Chapter XV,

(Lee et al., 1992) suggests a UN standing army. Others (Dennehy et al., 1993) advocate a stand-by force, and still others (Diehl, 1989) that no action be taken at all.

including acting as the chief administrative officer of the organization, acting as official secretary to delegate bodies, and overseeing reports and studies conducted at the request of the other major organizations (Mingst & Karns, 1995, p. 26). The secretary-general can bring peace and security matters to the attention of the Security Council (Article 99). In addition to Charter duties, the Secretary-General is a spokesperson for the UN, as well as a mediator and impartial third party in special circumstances.

With its primary goal “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” the UN Charter depends upon great power unity in response to threats to peace and security. Yet rising great power friction after World War II weakened Security Council unity and made effective response to threats problematic. The superpowers saw each conflict as a battle for political influence and were unwilling to accept any UN solution they perceived as running counter to their self-interest.

Immobile as a consequence of the cold war, the Council held approximately 130 meetings each year during the 1940s, yet by 1959, only five meetings were held (Bennett, 1995; Mingst & Karns, 1995). Vetoes frequently blocked Security Council action.³¹ As a consequence of the Security Council’s inability to reach consensus, sanctions have rarely been

³¹ Mingst & Karns (1995, p. 23) record the record of vetoes by each state from 1945-1994. Vetoes of the admission of new members were particularly frequent by the Soviets as they used it to prevent admissions of new members judged a part of the U.S. block. The United States depended upon its preponderance of votes to accomplish the same thing regarding new members seen as friendly to the Soviets. They both attempted to forestall a gain in power by the other.

used by the Security Council and have generally been unsuccessful.³² Collective security of the nature foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter has never been used.³³

Thus, in the years after 1945, while there have been many military interventions by states, the UN has almost habitually condemned them and has customarily not intervened. The 1970 Declaration of Friendly Relations approved by the General Assembly stated, “The practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations that threaten international peace and security...” (quoted in Roberts, 1993, p. 433).

As Weiss (1995) notes, “Intervention was never unlawful in itself, but the taboo against intervention, once considered the logical corollary of territorial sovereignty, was the unquestioned basis for both interstate relations and the UN Charter” (p. 196). UN peacekeeping operations initially came about as a way to deal with conflicts when the peaceful measures of Chapter VI seemed inadequate and use of coercion under Chapter VII was impossible due to the lack of great power unity and collective security during the cold war.³⁴

³² According to Bennett (1995, pp. 152-154) the enforcement of sanctions prior to 1990 “was very limited and singularly ineffective” while after 1990, Chapter VII sanctions did not fare much better. Weiss (1999) seconds Bennett’s view, noting both the increase in use of sanctions after 1990 and their ineffectiveness, which leads to civilian pain.

³³ There are only two cases which approximate collective security action: 1) Korea in 1950, and; 2) much more dubiously, Kuwait in 1991 (Luard, in Bull, 1984, p. 169). Both Bennett (1995) and Mingst & Karns (1995) find the 1991 Gulf War falling short of collective security, qualifying more as a “contract” operation. Bennett (1995) finds the Korean example falling short of fulfilling the requirements of a true collective security action for the same reason.

³⁴ From a legal point of view, some suggest peacekeeping is based on Article 40 of the Charter (United Nations, 1986, p. 97). Article 40 stipulates that prior to taking action under Article 41 (measures not involving use of force, such as the interruption of economic and diplomatic relations) or Article 42 (measures involving the use of force), the Security Council

This led former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to call peacekeeping “Chapter six and a half” (quoted by Annan, in Sharp, 1995, p. 405).

These operations fall broadly into two main categories, observer missions and peacekeeping forces.³⁵ The first observer mission was the United Nations Troop Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in the Middle East in June 1948. The first peacekeeping force was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in operation from November 1956 to May 1967. Never mentioned in the UN Charter, these operations fit neither the classical pattern of peaceful settlement nor the concept of collective security.³⁶

In deference to sovereignty, peacekeeping requires the consent of the disputing parties and operates with impartiality.³⁷ In addition, peacekeeping operations have functioned with

may take provisional measures to prevent a conflict situation from worsening. Any measures taken must be “without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned” (Bennett, 1995, p. 478).

³⁵ This broad typology is given by United Nations (1986) and is also used by Wiseman, in UNITAR (1987). UNITAR (1987) defines peace observation as missions “to observe, investigate and report on the compliance of the parties to a cease-fire.” Peacekeeping is the “interposition of military forces between belligerents to ensure the maintenance of a cease-fire and such other matters as detailed in a mandate” (p. 263).

³⁶ Several authors debate the difference between collective security and peacekeeping. Claude (1995) sees the difference as one of function. The missions assigned to the military forces differentiate the two. Peacekeeping force goals (he labels them preventative diplomacy forces) “do not include that of fighting to frustrate a deliberate and systematically organized campaign of aggression,” while collective security uses collective forces to combat a determined aggressor (p. 320). Bennett (1995) agrees, saying, “In peace-keeping operations, the objective is not to defeat an aggressor but to prevent fighting, act as a buffer, keep order, or maintain a ceasefire” (pp. 154-155).

³⁷ Bennett (1995) suggests that since there is no international territory, peacekeeping requires consent to operate on sovereign national soil (p. 155).

limited use of force restricted to self-defense. Diehl (1994) provides us with a good definition of peacekeeping:

Peacekeeping is therefore the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved (p. 13).

When UN peace operations were dispatched to deal with internal conflict, consent of the parties fulfilled the requirements of Article 2 forbidding the UN “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” when operating within the boundaries of the host state (Bennett, 1995, p. 468).³⁸

Intervention and Human Rights

The end of the Cold War led to a new environment for the UN and peace operations. Not only did the number of UN peace operations increase dramatically, the annual number of UN operations related to domestic conflict rose from less than five per year through the 1980s to an average of about eighteen per year in the first half of the 1990s (Blechman, in Crocker & Hampton, 1996, pp. 290-293). This increased level of intervention within the domestic concerns of states was often without the consent of the actors involved.

³⁸ See Grünigen (in Cassese, 1978) for more on the issue of consent as a waiver of sovereignty. Grünigen states, “According to general international law all measures taken on the territory of a given State by a foreign power, including an international organization, constitute an interference into the sovereignty of this State and are, therefore, lawful only if exercised with its consent. Within the scope of this consent, the host state temporarily waives its exclusive national competence with regard to any question concerning the presence and the functioning of the force” (p. 136).

Minear (in Weiss, 1995) points out the evolving dichotomy. Humanitarian action includes both assistance (meeting human needs for food, shelter and medical care) and protection (protecting basic human rights). In the traditional humanitarian operation the UN and other aid agencies carried out assistance activities while human rights organizations provided what protective functions they could. The constraint of sovereignty blocked both assistance and protection unless consent was given.

After the cold war, humanitarian interventions were deployed to relieve and to protect human rights. These short-term operations were designed “to relieve the stresses of war and to relieve acute suffering” (Durch, 1996, p. 4). These missions often operated without the consent of the host state (if a state even remained in existence) and limited the use of force to that which was authorized and necessary to achieve their objectives.

These new types of operations raise the question of sovereignty versus the right of the UN to intervene. What is the justification for international organizations to use force to relieve human suffering and protect human rights without the expressed permission of the state? Many point to the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War as weakening the prohibition against involvement in intrastate conflict.

After its expulsion from Kuwait, Iraq turned to brutal suppression of its Kurdish and Shiite populations in northern and southern Iraq. More than 2 million Kurds fled, but were not welcome in Turkey and Iran. The Security Council responded with Resolution 688, condemning Iraq’s actions toward its domestic population and labeling its actions a threat to international peace and security in the region. The Council insisted upon immediate access by humanitarian organizations to all parts of Iraq and asked for “an open dialogue...to ensure

that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.”³⁹ The Security Council justified Resolution 688 on the grounds of a threat to international peace and security due to refugee flows and cross-border incursions.⁴⁰

Iraq decried the resolution as intervention in its domestic affairs and a violation of the principle of sovereignty. It was already angry over UN demands for destruction of unconventional weapons, reparations, and the economic sanctions imposed on the country. The U.S., Britain, and France asserted that the resolution authorized deployment of their forces in Operation Provide Comfort into Iraq to protect relief efforts and create safe havens for the Kurds.

Resolution 688 marked the beginning of a debate about the basis for nonconsensual humanitarian operations (Roberts, 1993; Lamb, in Thakur & Thayer, 1995; Stromseth, in Damrosch, 1993). While the UN Charter in Article 2 (7) forbids the UN from intruding on matters “which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” a caveat states, “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Chapter VII is authorization for the use of force when responding to a threat to international peace and security (Akehurst, in Bull, 1984; Higgins, 1995).

³⁹ S/RES/688 (1991), available at: www.un.org/documents/scres/1991/scres91.htm. In part, it “Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region; Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.”

⁴⁰ See Roberts (1993, pp. 436-439) on Provide Comfort as a humanitarian operation.

By finding under Article 39 that there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the Security Council can take military action under Chapter VII to restore international peace and security. The danger of the conflict spreading to include other regional states is often cited as a threat to the peace.

Some legal scholars find in Resolution 688 “the UN’s first attempt to legitimize the doctrine of humanitarian intervention” (Alvarez, 1995, p. 8). Others, however, suggest that the UN was still far short of that goal (Stromseth, in Damrosch, 1993; Roberts, 1993). They note that while the Security Council was ready to justify intervention on the basis of a threat to other regional powers resulting from cross-border refugee flows, it did not specifically demand resolution of human rights issues. In addition, the resolution demonstrated the Security Council is reluctant to authorize military force to stop human rights violations. It did not authorize the use of force under Chapter VII or authorize forcible measures to protect citizens. Finally, the voting demonstrated severe splits in the Council regarding intervention over human rights. A few, including France and Britain, suggested Iraq’s violations of human rights were enough by themselves to justify intervention. Five members expressed concern about UN intervention in domestic affairs.

Many analysts argue that the concept of sovereignty is in any case eroding. For example, Hoffman (1996) suggests the legalist paradigm protects sovereignty but that sovereignty is less than absolute:

As most commentators on international relations have observed, there is a growing discrepancy between the norms of sovereignty and the traditional legal organization of the international system on the one hand, and the realities of a world in which the distinction between domestic politics and international politics is crumbling. (p. 13)

According to this view, sovereignty is wearing away due to the influence of several long-term trends, such as global economic interdependence, numerous physical and non-physical interventions in the name of ideology, and an increasing concern for human rights as a legitimate matter for international action. Since the end of the cold war, additional trends have emerged, including demands for self-determination, that have led to an acceleration of consciousness about the limits of sovereignty.

Some analysts specifically address the case of so-called “failed” state as an example of limits on sovereignty: “The traditional view of sovereignty has so decayed that all should recognize the appropriateness of U.N. measures inside member states to save them from self-destruction” (Helman & Ratner, 1992, p. 12). In addition, the danger of regional instability inherent in failed states such as Cambodia or Somalia justifies UN intervention to avoid the danger. Some analysts suggest that intervention in a failed state in the hope of restoring it is not a violation of sovereignty but an effort to restore it (Pasic & Weiss, 1997). Yet even in the case of failed states, some degree of consent of the state or a Security Council resolution pointing to peace and security is needed (Helman & Ratner, 1992).

While state sovereignty may be eroding and must be reexamined, many find value in some retention of sovereignty (Hoffmann, 1996). Sovereignty protects states against outsiders trying to topple the government, set up a puppet regime, or impose foreign views of what is good or bad. Even UN officials have tried to maintain a degree of respect for the idea. As Bertram (1995) notes:

In cases such as those of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and the Western Sahara, UN officials argue that sovereignty was preserved because the United Nations secured the consent of the national government. In the case of Namibia, the United Nations

simply rejected claims of sovereignty by the occupying forces of South Africa. In other cases, notably that of Somalia, the United Nations maintained that sovereignty was not at issue because no legitimate functioning government existed. (p. 391)

Several countries including China expressed unease about humanitarian intervention justified as a defense of peace and security expressly because it could provide a precedent for any intervention. They feel such intervention is a violation of Article 2 of the Charter (Alvarez, 1995).⁴¹ Legal scholars also argue that humanitarian intervention to protect noncombatants violates the sovereignty of the host nation if it takes place without consent (Higgins, in Sharp, 1995; Alvarez, 1995; Smith, 1998).⁴²

It is at this juncture that the question of individual rights enters the argument. Many, for example Eliasson (1995), suggest interventions in conflicts such as those in Cambodia, Namibia, and Somalia have become internationally acceptable as interventions with the sole purpose of supporting humanitarian requirements (p. 491). They claim there is a growing trend toward acceptance of interventions in support of human rights. The dichotomy between those who believe humanitarian intervention in support of human rights is wrong and those who believe such interventions are acceptable strikes at the heart of the intervention

⁴¹ On the Security Council vote for Resolution 688, Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe opposed it, and China and India abstained.

⁴² Minear (in Weiss, 1995) points out the evolving dichotomy. While humanitarian operations are currently thought of as both meeting human needs for food, shelter and medical care (assistance) as well as protecting basic human rights (protection), conventionally these were thought of as separate activities carried out by distinct organizations. The UN and other aid agencies carried out assistance activities while human rights organizations provided what protection functions they could. The two functions have only recently been seen as engaged in a common effort.

dilemma. Does the UN have the moral right, or perhaps even the duty, to intervene on the basis of protection of human rights? Does protection of human rights override the traditional norm of nonintervention?

Moral Aspects

“From the time of Augustine, theorists have maintained that a just war can be prosecuted only by a ‘competent authority’ … Medieval authors, with a watchful eye for peasant revolts, followed Augustine in confining the just use of force to princes” (Lackey, 1989, p. 29). The view of some is that the only authority that qualifies as a competent authority within a state is the government of that state. This view would not sanction UN operations in defense of human rights as these are interventions within a state often without its consent. Is there a new competent authority such as the UN that can determine when justification for such intrusion upon a state’s sovereignty is appropriate?

Michael Walzer, writing in 1977 (before the burgeoning number of peace operations), ruled out the violation of sovereignty through intervention except in two cases. In his first case, they are wrong “unless they are authorized, I suppose, by the society of nations” (p. 106). This type of international action approximates the role of domestic law enforcement and police work, but the law is unilaterally enforced and the police are self-appointed. His second case goes beyond the legalist paradigm. “Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts ‘that shock the moral conscience of mankind’” (Walzer, 1977, p. 7). Thus, intervention can be justified for moral reasons.⁴³

According to Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter the only just cause for the use of force is defense against an armed attack against yourself or another (Bennett, 1995). Cicero says in On Commonwealth: “Wars are unlawful which are undertaken without a reason. For no war can be justly waged except for the purpose of redressing an injury or of driving out an invader” (Cicero, 1976, p. 217). Contemporary theorists are beginning to recognize the prevention of serious and ongoing violations of human rights as justification:

What would be needed now is, in the first place, providing a normative basis for legitimate collective action, a *jus ad interventionem*. Our “universal maxim” has already been stated: it allows for collective intervention when a state’s condition or behavior results in grave threats to other states’ and peoples’ peace and security, and in grave and massive violations of human rights...sovereignty can be overridden whenever the behavior of the state even within its own territory threatens the existence of elementary human rights abroad, and whenever the protection of the rights of its own members can be assured only from the outside. (Hoffmann, 1996: 23)

Consequently, there is a justification for intervention when a state’s acts shock the moral conscience, or a state’s behavior threatens human rights outside or inside its boundaries

⁴³ Walzer (1977) takes a statist view of intervention, suggesting it shouldn’t always be a UN intervention. In fact, his example of intervention was the Indian invasion of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 because “it was a rescue, simply and narrowly defined” (p. 105). Walzer notes that the moral crimes committed by the government of Pakistan against its own people were brought to the attention of the UN—to no avail. He sees little legitimacy added by UN sponsorship: “Nor is it clear to me that action undertaken by the UN, or by a coalition of powers, would necessarily have had a moral quality superior to that of the Indian attack...I don’t think that there is any moral reason to adopt that posture of passivity that might be called waiting for the UN (waiting for the universal state, waiting for the messiah...)” (Walzer,

(Walzer, 1977). Thus many suggest humanitarian intervention can be justified on the basis of individual rights (Bhattachariyya, 1994).

Nevertheless the international environment operates on the basis of the legal rights of states and not individuals. How is this barrier overcome?

If only individual persons have rights, then the so-called rights of *nations* are derived from the rights of individual persons, and governments and political leaders pursuing policies in the name of the “nation” are normally justified only to the degree that their policies fulfill or defend the rights of their constituents; the only right of a state is the right to defend the rights of its citizens. If the government and political leaders pursue policies that suppress the rights of their own people, then they cannot defend those policies against principled, good Samaritan interventions on grounds of a right of national sovereignty. (Lackey, 1989, p. 38)

When states violate or fail to protect the basic rights of their own citizens, intervention is an appropriate response.

This is a point of view gaining wider acceptance. Noting the “developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter,” UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, in an interview in the 18 September 1999 The Economist states:

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual,

1977, p. 107). For Walzer, any state capable of stopping what he terms “the slaughter” can act as a competent authority.

enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. (p. 49)

Accordingly, both Lackey and Annan claim that sovereignty is an instrumental good meant to serve the individual. When a state does not serve its instrumental purpose, it loses its sovereignty and is subject to intervention intended to right the wrongs being done to the individuals within that state.

But which rights violations furnish justification for intervention? For some, it is just to intervene in cases in which a government violates basic values, including “the physical safety of the citizens and their freedom from alien domination” (Lackey, 1989, p. 38). Others point to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many later attempts to establish a universal standard. Yet these instruments often outline rights far beyond those considered basic. In any case, they do not outline criteria to trigger the intervention or guide the selection for which cases justify intervention.⁴⁴

A recent development gaining wider acceptance is the concept of human security. Human security has been defined along the lines of the progressive values of the 1990s: human rights, international humanitarian law, and human development. A more concise definition has evolved, however, making a distinction between human security and human development. This implies that human security is a useful concept for sudden crisis-like

⁴⁴ Secretary-General Annan, interviewed in The Economist (18 September 1999), states, “if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world’s peoples, intervention must be based on legitimate and universal principles” (p. 49).

events that threaten security in an immediate way, whereby human development is more precisely understood as long-term structural change. This definition offers clarification of the difference between basic values and wide-ranging human rights.⁴⁵

Others raise the possibility that a policy of intervention in defense of human rights can establish a double standard. How can the UN intervene in one country when it refuses to do so in another? Recognizing that intervention is not feasible in all situations, many analysts suggest it is better to intervene infrequently than not at all (Maynes, 1993). Others point out the need to evaluate each situation independently, “examining the various political contexts” before each decision (Beitz, in Held, 1991, p. 254).

The violation of basic human rights is a necessary but not sufficient justification for intervention in the form of humanitarian operations. Therefore, the right to intervene does not imply a duty to intervene. Augustine says, “Just wars are usually defined as those that avenge injuries, when a nation or a city should be punished for failing to right a wrong done by its citizens, or to return what has been taken away unjustly” (quoted by Aquinas, in Sigmund, 1988, p. 65). In this case, what have been taken away unjustly are the basic rights of the citizens.

How much force is morally justified in an environment where factional soldier and civilian may look the same—does the right of the intervening force to self-defense excuse civilian deaths? Do peacekeepers possess the moral right to stop war crimes and arrest perpetrators? As Raimo Vayrynen notes, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, and in particular, Somalia have shown that “local power holders can obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid

⁴⁵ See Suhrke (1999) for more on human security.

and unduly benefit by confiscating it" (Vayrynen, in Hoffmann, 1996, p. 8). This experience indicates that the ability to conduct these operations requires at least some armed protection of the convoys and deliveries. If UN operations are conducted with only the mandate of Chapter VI and an aim of complete impartiality, then local power relations must be accepted and humanitarian access must be negotiated.

This approach would probably lead to untenable situations in which aid workers and peacekeepers become pawns in local power politics. To avoid this, peacekeepers must have the right to use limited force to protect deliveries and show determination for deterrent purposes. Vayrynen (in Hoffmann, 1996) offers a useful critique of this approach:

This advice is in many respects sound. It sends the message that the use of force by international troops is limited to humanitarian purposes and self-defense, thus avoiding the escalation of the conflict. The message is that if the adversaries permit international operations to protect the victims, they will not be challenged by peacekeepers in a more serious way. This position has, however, several drawbacks.

(p. 8)

The major drawback Vayrynen identifies is that this position does not entitle the peacekeepers to use force even if they observe war crimes and violations of human rights. He suggests stressing the support peacekeeping can give to protect human rights via increased emphasis on international legal instruments such as laws on human rights, refugees, and warfare. However, since peacekeepers must be trained to monitor and enforce these laws, it may require a greater commitment to military action than the international community is ready to accept.

The UN Security Council, eager to become involved in operations to protect basic human rights in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, is notably reticent after dismal performances there. The UN has increasingly been willing to allow other organizations, such as NATO in the former Yugoslavia or the Organization for African Unity in Chad, to conduct operations under UN resolution.

In his 1984 Intervention in World Politics, Hedley Bull asked if the gap between the rule of non-intervention and the facts of intervention had become so vast that the rule of non-intervention needed to be set aside. The rule of non-intervention is based upon the sovereignty of nations, a sovereignty many suggest is today “trumped” by the individual human rights of citizens. While it is too soon to suggest the demise of the rule of non-intervention, the international community has found legal justification for interventions in Article 39 of the UN Charter, and the perception of sovereignty as an instrumental good serving the state’s citizens is gaining in acceptance. The rising number of intra-state conflicts and the international community’s increased willingness to become involved in them strongly suggest the need to be prepared to conduct those interventions successfully.

III. Theory of Peace Operations

The Elusive Notion Of Success

In a strictly theoretical sense, it is wrong to classify operations as successes or failures without reference to some kind of objective standard. From a more practical point of view, the failure to conceptualize peacekeeping success can lead to misguided policies. (Bratt, in Pugh, 1997, p. 65)

It is necessary to concisely define the dependent variable, success, first before turning to factors influencing relative success in peace operations. There is a clear lack of consensus on a definition of success or, conversely, failure (Stiles & MacDonald, 1992; Fetherston, 1994; Bratt, in Pugh, 1997). Analysts examining peace operations deal with the issue in several ways. At one end of the continuum, some writers investigating peace operations simply use the terms success and failure without defining it or establishing criteria for its application (e.g. Dandeker & Gow, 1997; Argersinger, 1991). They rely upon "face validity," assuming it is obvious which operations are successful and which are failures.⁴⁶

Unfortunately, without a systematic definition of success, one investigator may consider an operation a success, while another may gauge it a failure. Consequently, accurately isolating which factors may have led to the outcome is problematic. Analysts relying upon face validity also fail to consider operations that may have had some success accompanied by some failure and were consequently a relative success. Any attempt to develop a theory of peace operations without a systematic definition of success will produce inconsistent results.

⁴⁶ The term "face validity" is Diehl's (1994, p. 33).

Others find success and failure in peace operations simply too difficult to define due to the differing operational environments and mandates for each operation (Durch, 1993b, 1996⁴⁷; Hunt, 1994⁴⁸). They cite the uniqueness of each operation as justification for not providing a systematic definition of success or a theory of peace operations. While each operation may in fact be unique, each also contains common characteristics. As Berdal (1993) states, “Although the context of UN peacekeeping has changed dramatically since its emergence ...its fundamental characteristics and conditions for success remain the same” (p. 76).⁴⁹ UN peace operations are established by a resolution, all are fielded to contain conflict, and so on.

Further along the continuum, a number of studies rely upon a sole criterion to define and measure success. One such example is defining success of peace operations in terms of their relative contribution to maintenance of world peace (Rikhye, Harbottle, & Egge, 1974;

⁴⁷ It is interesting to note that while Durch’s 1993 book states that “success and failure in peacekeeping are not readily definable in black and white terms,” he goes on to say, “Each case includes an assessment of how well the UN force fulfilled the mandate it was given” (p. 13). His 1996 work discusses success in several operations within the framework of the criteria suggested by Paul Diehl in his *International Peacekeeping* (discussed below), but Durch finds these criteria “difficult to apply” (p. 17) due to the differing goals the state in which the operation is posted, the troop contributing states, and the Security Council may have for each operation. Both books provide narrative assessments of each operation that, while instructive and useful, are more a summary of the operation and its “lessons learned” than a systematic assessment of outcome or its influencing factors.

⁴⁸ Hunt (1994) leaves judgments of success up to the military commander of each operation because “there are no definitive characteristics of a successful end state,” but offers indicators of success linked to the end of conflict and initiation of negotiations (p. 85).

⁴⁹ Others agree that, even though unique, patterns are there to be found, e.g., Manwaring (1991): “Even though every conflict is situation-specific, it is not completely unique. There are analytical commonalities in all types of struggle” (p. 19). Manwaring & Fishel (1992) repeat this assertion.

Kahan, in Quinn, 1994; Zacarias, 1996; Kaufman, 1996⁵⁰). Perhaps this is a reflection of the UN Charter's stated purpose to maintain international peace and security. Unfortunately, these studies do not define peace or offer criteria for how peace ought to be measured.

The lack of an adequate definition of peace has led to a sharp debate over its use as a criterion of success. Some suggest that simply separating the belligerents in a conflict is an adequate measure regardless of how long the operation must remain in place (James, in Thakur & Thayer, 1995; Urquhart, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990). If the world wishes to avoid armed conflict, it must be patient with lengthy peace operations; peace (and success) simply consists of curtailing the conflict.⁵¹

Others disagree, proposing that a successful peace operation must not only effectively separate the factions in a conflict but must also resolve the cause of the conflict (Durch, 1993b; Copley, 1997). Some argue that simply separating belligerents may actually prolong the conflict. A peace operation, which by its presence maintains peaceful coexistence between two or more hostile parties, often eliminates the sense of urgency that crises impart. This may in fact subvert the search for a permanent solution to the hostility.⁵² Given these concerns, a more convincing argument insists that peace operations do have important roles beyond

⁵⁰ Kaufman (1996) defines success as the complete absence of armed conflict, a difficult benchmark to realize.

⁵¹ Hunt (1994), while stating that military commanders of peace operations should judge success, does state that when it is the goal of the international community to stop a war via peace enforcement, "the absence of failure must sometimes be deemed a success." He states further, "a year of peace in such circumstances [long term disputes] must be deemed a success" (p. 85).

⁵² Many make the point that peace operations may actually perpetuate rather than resolve the situation (Urquhart, in Wiseman, 1983; Wiseman, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990).

conflict termination, to include a negotiation process and the implementation of the settlement leading to resolution.⁵³ In this manner, peace operations are responsible for preparing the way for peace by terminating conflict and in facilitating the work of the negotiators who must seek a lasting resolution.

Another example of defining success by one criterion is through a counterfactual comparison of the actual results of a peace operation that took place to the expected impact upon present and future generations if it had not occurred at all (Johansen, 1994). There is no specification of exactly how this nebulous definition is to be measured. Because we cannot know except by pure speculation what would have happened if the operation had not occurred, this criterion fails to establish the systematic benchmark needed for deriving lessons applicable to multiple contexts.⁵⁴

Another single criterion of success is a measure of the impact of the peace operation upon the people living in the host nation (Johansen, 1994; Whitworth, 1995⁵⁵; Ratner, in Selig & Nishihara, 1995). It would certainly seem appropriate to consider how a peace operation may have affected the inhabitants of the disputed area. Still, this criterion is also vaguely

⁵³ I agree with Hampson (1996), who sees third party support in these three roles—conflict termination, the negotiation process, and implementation of the settlement—as instrumental to the long term success of peace settlements. Crocker joins with Hampson (1996) in advocating this view.

⁵⁴ In Druckman & Stern (1997), Diehl, Durch and Ratner all condemn the use of counterfactuals as a definition of success.

⁵⁵ Whitworth reviews six works on peacekeeping and critiques them as a group for asking only technical questions while ignoring both important political questions and important actors; specifically, no one asks the citizens of host countries whether they think peacekeeping is successful.

defined with little specification of how it is to be measured. One investigator refines this criterion to suggest using the number of civilian casualties that occurred during the operation to measure its impact (Clarke & Herbst, 1997).⁵⁶ While this is certainly an important and potentially systematic measure, it is questionable whether the single indicator of civilian casualties is alone an adequate gauge of success.

Perhaps the most tempting of the single criteria for measuring success is the performance of the operation in living up to its United Nation's mandate (James, 1995⁵⁷; Durch, 1993b; GAO, 1997⁵⁸). The UN Security Council mandate authorizing the operation would seem an appropriate measuring stick to determine the operation's degree of success. The mandate should set the goals for the operation in objective terms. Yet even use of the mandate as a singular measure of success is problematic. As Diehl (1994) notes, "the mandates given operations are frequently vague, and there is much room for debate on the scope and detail of the operation's mission; this alone makes it difficult to assess whether the designs of the mandate have been achieved" (p. 33). Mandates are often the result of political bargaining in the Security Council and can represent a least common denominator solution to conflicting domestic goals of members (Urquhart, in Wiseman, 1983; Bratt, 1997).

⁵⁶ Clark and Herbst (1997), in the conclusion to their Somalia case study, write, "Somalia was not a failure. The United States initiated an operation that saved approximately 100,000 lives" (p. 252).

⁵⁷ James (1995) does not specifically address criteria for success, but implies that failure to implement mandates may indicate failure.

⁵⁸ The GAO (1997) categorizes eight operations as "successful," "partially successful," or "not successful" based solely upon the degree to which they carried out their mandate. The report notes concerns expressed by the U.S. Mission to the UN that such a one-dimensional approach does not adequately capture the complex nature of success (p. 8).

Although popular, definitions of success using singular measures are inadequate. Researchers point out that failure in one dimension does not imply failure on all dimensions. Singular measures recognize success as an “either or” alternative of success or failure on a single aspect of an operation even though other dimensions may indicate a relative success (Haas, in UNITAR, 1987; Bratt, 1997; Milburn, 1997).⁵⁹ A peace operation can clearly fail in one way but succeed in others. For example, it is reasonable to suggest that even if an operation fails to reach the goals of the mandate but does keep civilian and military casualties low and does resolve the conflict, it should be considered a success. A single criterion cannot reflect this condition, while selection of multiple criteria would allow determination of relative success.

In recognition of this shortcoming, some studies combine the criterion of mandate completion with others (Stiles & MacDonald, 1992; Farris, 1994; Weiss, 1995). Yet as these studies show, simply adding measures does not automatically resolve the problems associated with sole measures. In these studies, the added measures either do not measure success at all, provide an excessively narrow definition of success, or are only useful for analysis of limited case studies.⁶⁰ Merely increasing the number of criteria has not in these cases sharpened the definition of success.

⁵⁹ Ernest Haas, writing in UNITAR (1987) on the success of UN and the other organizations in managing disputes, states, “Failure on one dimension and overall decline do not imply failure on all dimensions” (p. 12). Bratt (1997) suggests any definition of success must include degrees of success to account for the mixed record characteristic of many operations. Milburn (1997) concurs, stating, “The dichotomy of success and failure rarely seems to fit” (p. 8). He suggests measuring partial success and partial failures.

Diehl (1994) moves the definition of success further along the continuum, suggesting two criteria: an operation's ability to limit armed conflict and its role in facilitating the resolution of the underlying dispute between those protagonists.⁶¹ Diehl discusses how these criteria are to be measured via indicators, identifies categories of relative success for each of his indicators, and then applies his criteria to five UN and one non-UN operation (the revised 1994 edition adds Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia). He finds a mixed record of success on limiting armed conflict, and uniform failure when it comes to conflict resolution.

In spite of Diehl's improvements, observers suggest that he misses in several ways the opportunity to fulfill his own goal of empirical generalization. First, Diehl defines success in terms of indicators based on a narrow definition of the characteristics of traditional peacekeeping, eschewing other types of peace operations.⁶² Consequently, his success criteria

⁶⁰ Stiles and MacDonald (1972) recommend developing a standard by “taking into account the operational goals of most UN peacekeeping forces as embodied in a succession of resolutions” but are unclear about exactly what the standard should be (p. 310). Farris (1994) combines two criteria: exit date specified by mandate, and staying within budget limits, criteria that are an excessively narrow measure of success. Weiss (1995) advocates evaluating operations for success based upon three criteria. For Weiss, the most important measure is whether ambitious mandates are given proper resources. For his second indicator he recommends comparing individual operations to determine which was faced with the severest difficulties and was able to overcome them. Finally, he suggests considering the importance of the wider range of assets the UN could bring to bear as compared to non-UN operations. His first criterion is more a contributor to success than a measure of it; his last two are unsystematic criteria that are restricted to comparative case studies.

⁶¹ Diehl (1987) suggests that peace operations that do not resolve disputes are failures, yet still may save many lives and encourage stability. In his 1994 work, Diehl suggests success should be measured partly by how well the operation facilitates conflict resolution but continues to measure success by whether they actually end the conflict. Diehl notes that peacekeeping forces do not normally have provisions for peacemaking, and they must rely upon other agencies for that responsibility.

may not be suitable across the entire spectrum of peace operations. In addition, by limiting his selection of criteria to only two, he fails to take advantage of other important criteria, such as mandate completion and the impact of the operation on the local population, criteria that could enrich his definition.

Second, when examining his cases in the light of his two criteria, he provides no systematic evaluation of success such as partially successful, fully successful, etc. Although he outlines categories for his indicators, he ultimately depends upon a subjective narrative evaluation of cases. For example when evaluating the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC), Diehl (1994) suggests it “does not rate well” on one indicator and assigns a “mixed bag” rating to the operation (p. 53). As Kraska (1995) notes, Diehl’s narrative analysis “lacks the rigor or testability that would qualify the findings as empirical” (p. 134). Without categories, it is impossible to measure in any systematic way success or failure.

Brown (1993; 1997) improves upon the use of multiple criteria for success. Brown expands upon Diehl’s definition by utilizing three criteria, including degree of mandate completion, whether or not the operation led to a resolution of the underlying disputes of the conflict, and whether the operation augmented international peace and security by curtailing conflict. Brown (1997) utilizes categories specifying how to rank each peace operation by relative degree of success based upon how well they performed against her criteria. Brown’s categories include:

1. Successful—resulting in a lasting settlement;

⁶² Durch, in Druckman & Stern (1997), makes this point, saying, “they may not be sufficiently encompassing for more complex types of missions” (p. 158). Durch sees Diehl’s criteria as a good starting point.

2. Relative success—conflict has abated or ended, or the mandate has been fulfilled, but lasting resolution is absent or unclear;
3. Mixed results—parts of the mandate were fulfilled; there were also failures but the entire operation did not fail;
4. Failure/lack of success—the mandate was not fulfilled, or conflict or unrest resumed;
5. Inconclusive—evaluation is premature because either the operation is recently operational and it is too soon to judge the outcome, conflict still persists in area, or acceptance by the parties is slipping. (p. 18)

Brown (1997) also included all past and current peace operations in her assessment.

Brown's approach is an important step forward in the success criteria debate. By combining three important criteria—degree of mandate completion, conflict containment, and conflict resolution—she is able to mitigate the shortcomings of single indicators. For example, by balancing her first criteria, mandate performance, with other criteria, Brown acknowledges that while mandates are sometimes vague about the scope and detail of the operation's mission, the mandate is still the sole representation of the goals of the Security Council and cannot be ignored.

In her second and third criteria, Brown (1997) provides a solution to the debate between whether success requires conflict containment or conflict resolution by providing degrees of success within her categories. Recognizing the responsibility of UN peace operations to work in concert with diplomatic efforts, complete success requires a lasting resolution of the dispute. Yet unlike definitions of success based upon resolution as a sole criteria, an operation that contains the conflict and fulfills the mandate even though it does not

provide lasting resolution is still a relative success.⁶³ Lasting dispute resolution is thus appropriately assigned more weight in determinations of success than conflict containment. Finally, her definition of success is systematic, capable of applying to the entire spectrum of peace operations.

Yet Brown, like Diehl, fails to resolve several difficulties in her conceptual definition of success and its application. In determining overall success for each operation, she often assigns more than one category to the operation. Brown relies upon leading works in the literature to determine placement of operations within categories. When these sources do not agree, she fails to resolve the difference and simply mirrors the discrepancy. For example, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is rated both a “relative success” and “mixed results.” Others are rated both “mixed results” and “failure.” Nine of thirty-nine cases evaluated are given more than one overall rating.

Since Brown provides no guidance in the form of indicators that would help measure her criteria, she is left with no means to adjudicate discrepancies between her sources. The result is more a categorization of current literature than a systematic assessment of the relative success of peace operations. Failure to resolve these ambiguities is a serious drawback that calls into question the rigor of her examination.

Bratt (in Pugh, 1997) combines and refines the criteria suggested by Diehl and Brown, resulting in a systematic definition of success capable of effective application that marks the end of the definitional continuum. I use Bratt’s criteria to form the foundation for my

⁶³ Alberts & Hayes (1995) find that “the measures of success for peacekeeping are stability and a transition to a long-term peace” (p. 23). Peace enforcement operations must first transition to peacekeeping operations to gain these measures of success.

definition of success. Bratt defines success by four measures: mandate performance, facilitating conflict resolution, containing the conflict, and the ability to limit casualties including civilian deaths. He analyzes 39 peace operations conducted between 1945 and 1996, first measuring each of his four criteria individually and then determining its overall success via a combined ranking. The results of both the individual and the combined measurements are categorized as complete success, moderate success, or failure.

Bratt's criteria overcome many of the difficulties associated with previous attempts to measure the success of peace operations. First, like Brown, Bratt applies his criteria to a systematic measurement of all peace operations. This allows for an evaluation of the entire record of UN peace operations, overcoming the deficiency in single or selective case study approaches.⁶⁴ Second, by measuring and combining more than one criterion for success, Bratt, like Diehl and to a greater degree, Brown, overcomes the shortcomings of relying upon a single indicator measuring only one component of success.

Third, Bratt amends Diehl's criterion concerning limitation of armed conflict by measuring the operation's ability to limit civilian casualties resulting from both combat and indirect causes such as famine and disease. Diehl considers only combatant deaths, but Bratt adds this measure of the operation's immediate impact upon the population in the host country by considering civilian casualties.⁶⁵ This is an important addition that makes Bratt's definition of success more comprehensive.

⁶⁴ Bratt's total of 39 operations falls short of today's 52 operations as it excludes those operations that had begun too recently to be evaluated at the time of his 1997 analysis.

Fourth, Bratt, like Brown, answers questions concerning the relative importance of lasting dispute resolution and conflict containment by also establishing lasting dispute resolution as the benchmark for complete success. Finally, Bratt moves beyond the subjective methodology of Diehl by meticulously applying his criteria and assigning categories both within operations and between operations. His use of indicators allows him to determine a single overall level of success for each of his four criteria and, subsequently, the operation as a whole. In short, Bratt provides an empirical record of success specifying exactly what success is and how it can be measured.

Yet simply determining the outcome of past operations does not answer the need for a theoretical framework for peace operations. The factors influencing the outcome must be considered. Bratt (in Pugh, 1997) offers no independent variables himself, noting, "There is an urgent need to explain why peace operations succeed or fail" (p. 79).⁶⁵ The factors influencing the success of peace operations must be identified. Only through an empirical study can scholars understand these relationships and thereby develop an effective theory of peace operations. Determination of these factors is the critical empirical link between experience and theory.

⁶⁵ Bratt (in Pugh, 1997) discusses Johansen's (1994) suggestion that success be considered as "the effect of peacekeeping operations on local people" (309). Bratt finds utility in this approach, but pitfalls as well, such as difficulty determining the appropriate variables to be used and the time frames to be measured and compared.

⁶⁶ Bratt (1997b) authored a study examining the influence of six variables on success, but applied them to only six cases, used several variables more than once (i.e., consent to measure both the role of the parties and compliance with traditional peacekeeping), and failed to rank order his variables by level of importance. Consequently, his analysis, while an excellent starting point, is unsystematic.

IV. Independent Variables That Increase Or Decrease The Probability Of Success

It is clear that further research into peace operations is necessary if a useful theory of peace operations is to be developed (Bratt, 1997; Diehl, in Druckman & Stern, 1997; Fetherston, 1994).⁶⁷ Bratt's objective standard of success provides the first step, but scholars leave the most important part of the task, empirically and systematically determining what factors facilitate or constrain success, undone. Based upon prior research on peace operations, I develop a theory of peace operations based upon the factors that can influence success, categorized as contextual factors, mission factors and political factors.

Contextual factors include a number of variables that are not amenable to control but can potentially be compensated by other factors, while the variables included in mission factors and political factors are open to direct control. I introduce each variable, and then discuss its potential impact upon the outcome of peace operations. Finally, I state a hypothesis based upon each variable's anticipated bivariate influence upon the dependent variable.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Commenting on what is needed in peace operation research, Diehl (1997) stated, "I have a strong preference for a theoretical approach that informs the policy process...I would advocate research that seeks to build a data set with explicit, systematic criteria for peacekeeping success (defining the latter in many different ways with a series of separate variables)...the specific information gathered would reflect theoretical expectations about which factors influence peacekeeping success and failure (for example, conflict type, neutrality, and so on). Quantitative assessments could, then, be made to determine which factors are associated with peacekeeping success, and how these effects vary when adopting different standards of assessment" (p. 160). Fetherston (1994) also finds "obvious problems with our current level of understanding about which elements of peacekeeping...contribute most to success or failure" (p. 42).

⁶⁸ Although this proposal presents hypotheses as bivariate relationships (as though there were just one independent variable influencing the dependent variable), it must be acknowledged that there are numerous independent variables that may interact with each other (see Ott,

Contextual Factors

The potential for success of any peace operation is likely to be influenced by the context of the conflict. These are factors over which policymakers and the military force commander can exert little or no influence, but which can still potentially influence success. In some cases, these factors might militate against deployment of an operation or, if an operation is deployed, suggest a certain force structure for the military component conducting the operation.

Consent is often cited as the single most important variable in leading to a successful peace operation (Berdal, 1993; Durch, 1993b; Dobbie, 1994; Boutros-Ghali, 1995⁶⁹; Kaufman, 1996; Bratt, 1997). Consent is usually described as the permission of the government or all parties concerned for the deployment of the peace operation.⁷⁰ Consent may range from acceptance of the peace operation on the part of governments, the general public, and third parties, to their complete rejection of the operation. When consent of the parties is present, it allows the military operation to enter into a permissive environment and allows the building of trust between the peace operation and local actors.

1988, pp. 469-471, or Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996, pp. 437-438). For example, consent of parties as a contextual variable may be influenced by impartiality, a mission variable. Potential interactions and their impact upon success will be considered with the presentation of empirical evidence in Chapter V.

⁶⁹ Boutros-Ghali (1995) suggests that a review of recent (pre-1995) successes and failures shows that in all the successes consent was respected and in most of the less successful operations it wasn't. Once again, however, success is not defined, nor is the analysis applied systematically.

⁷⁰ Wiseman (1983) points out that the level of consent of non-state parties involved is important, and suggests this level is often low. Liu (1992) seconds Wiseman's view on third parties, and suggests that parties outside of governments (i.e., internal factions, liberation movements, and irregular armed elements) may not extend consent.

High levels of consent indicate that the belligerent actors question the utility of continued violence and desire a third party presence such as the UN to act as an impartial arbiter. The actors, seeking the benefits of a reduction in violence, have already agreed to an end to armed conflict and may have agreed to a settlement plan. Under these circumstances, the job of the peacekeepers should be relatively easy, as the actors have an incentive to cooperate with the mission. It is much easier to attain success as measured by mandate performance, facilitating conflict resolution, containing the conflict, and the ability to limit casualties with actor consent.

Conversely, low levels of consent will have a deleterious impact upon success. Subnational or secessionist actors contesting the legitimacy of the peace operation may see the operation as a threat to their interests, while third party states may also view peace operations as a threat and provide crucial support to factions that do not support its presence. Violence may be directed against the operation itself or civilians; containing the conflict, limiting casualties, and completing the mandate may become more difficult when consent is absent from the outset or retracted after the mission began.

Consent has always been an accepted requirement for deployment of peace operations. On the other hand, peace enforcement operations often operate with low consent and consequently must rely upon force as a coercive tool. In fact, peace enforcement operations have been deployed into states in the midst of civil collapse, the so-called failed or anarchical state, where lack of a state actor makes any semblance of consent unlikely.⁷¹ Peacekeeping

⁷¹ The term “anarchical state” is used by Ratner (1995, p. 29), while the term “failed state” is preferred by Berdal (1993, p. 26) and others.

and peace enforcement are thus separated by whether consent is present (Dobbie, 1994; Hunt, 1994; Wiseman, 1983⁷²). In addition, some operations can potentially deploy with assurances of the consent of all parties, but experience decay in the level of consent of one or more of the actors during the operation.⁷³

Consent as a dividing line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement has serious policy implications. If consent allows peacekeeping forces to deploy in an ad hoc fashion with a minimum of force unity and equipment, a lack of consent might imply the need for highly cohesive, well-equipped forces. Consequently, decaying levels of consent during an operation may raise the most serious policy implications regarding the military component of the operation, the mandate under which it is operating, and its use of force, as policymakers must face a possible transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement (Findlay, 1996).

I argue that the level of consent has a direct bearing upon the potential for success of a peace operation. If a high level of consent exists, the operation should find that limiting casualties, including civilian deaths, and containing the conflict is simplified. In addition, the prospect for facilitating the resolution of the conflict is more straightforward. Operations deploying into contexts with lower levels of consent and those confronted with decaying consent are vulnerable on all counts. Consequently, I hypothesize that the potential for

⁷² Wiseman (1983) also ranks consent as the primary requirement of successful peace operations, and separates peacekeeping and peace enforcement by the presence or absence of consent. He adds that the level of consent of non-state parties involved in the conflict is also important, and suggests that this level is often low.

⁷³ Ratner (1995) agrees that consent provides the dividing line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and reviews the options facing the UN when consent decays, a situation he expects the UN will confront more often in the future. Mackinlay (in Weiss, 1995) agrees.

success in peace operations will increase as the level of consent of all actors involved in the operation increases. I rank consent as the most important variable both within its category and among the three categories.

The second contextual component many analysts suggest as a major influence on success is the type of conflict (Diehl, 1994; Weiss, 1995; Skjelsbaek, 1989; Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Liu, 1992; Berdal, 1993; King, 1997). Prior to 1988, peace operations were primarily involved in interstate conflicts. Since 1988, intrastate conflict predominated as UN operations participated in termination of disputes between factions in one state, as well as an internationalized form of intrastate conflict where belligerent support by outside states added an interstate dimension to the intrastate confrontation.

There are several characteristics of intrastate conflict that can leave the conflict highly resistant to resolution. First are the powerful emotions of the belligerents. Intrastate conflict is often sustained by historical hatred and deep-seated fears, and blind sentiment overcomes rational calculations about the conflict. The second characteristic is the incompatible communal values and identities hardened by the conflict itself that can prevent compromise and settlement. These internal dynamics of intrastate wars have three consequences for peace operations: intrastate wars are often especially vicious with high levels of violence, the actors involved are often exceptionally resistant to negotiation, and peace settlements are rare and notoriously precarious. Consequently, intrastate conflict tends to be extraordinarily cruel and protracted.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ See King (1997) for a succinct review of these patterns. Mackinlay (in Weiss, 1995) also discusses the difficulty of negotiation in these circumstances.

In addition, numerous armed factions participate in intrastate conflict due to the presence of terrorist groups, militias, and others. These factions are often joined in uncertain alliances and mixed in an environment with no clear boundaries between them. Obtaining enduring consent from numerous parties dedicated to conflict is difficult, leading to the problems already noted as endemic when consent is absent.

The internationalization of intrastate conflict exacerbates the problems caused by the number of factions involved. Few intrastate conflicts today are wholly internal. Outside state actors often become involved in intrastate conflicts due to concern over human rights issues, fear of intrastate conflict spreading outside of borders, apprehension about international economic effects, or in direct ideological support of a belligerent party. External support for factions magnifies the already difficult process of obtaining and maintaining consent.

Therefore, I argue that peace operations in intrastate conflicts should be less successful than those in interstate conflicts (Diehl, 1994). The potential for reduced consent and other internal characteristics of intrastate clashes leaves these conflicts highly resistant to conflict termination and resolution. The exceptional cruelty of these conflicts adversely impacts the ability to limit casualties of peace operations forces and civilians. As a result, I hypothesize that the potential for success in peace operations will be lowest in internationalized intrastate conflict, improve in intrastate conflict without international actors, and be highest in interstate conflicts.

Geographic considerations are argued by some to be a third contextual component important to the success of a peace operation (Diehl, 1994; Skjelsbaek, 1989; Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990). The larger the size of the area, the more difficult the terrain, the denser the vegetation, and the more natural barriers such as mountains or hills, the more

difficult the operation will be as peace forces attempt to complete the mandate's objectives. In addition, it will be difficult for a peace operation to keep outside states from assisting one of the belligerents if there are a number of shared borders to seal. Conversely, low population densities counterbalance some of these ill effects. Additionally, peace operation force commanders can exert some limited influence over these characteristics by choosing defensible positions and, when allowed, by providing clear and wide lines of separation between belligerents.

Large landmasses, difficult terrain, and high numbers of state borders all make peacekeeping and peace enforcement more difficult as the forces become thinly deployed.⁷⁵ As a result, I hypothesize that the potential for success in peace operations will be lowest where landmasses are large, terrain is mountainous, the area is densely populated, and the number of state borders is high. Conversely, the potential for success is highest when the opposite is true.

Mission Factors

Mission factors focus on those dynamics that are intrinsic to the military component of the peace operation, dynamics that involve the organization, deployment, or direction of the force. These are factors within the power of the UN and its designated force commander to control, factors such as force impartiality, force unity, command and control, and size of force. The implication for policy making is that the quality of the force actually conducting the peace operation has a role in determining success.

⁷⁵ Kaufman (1996) disagrees, suggesting it is really consent, not geography that matters (p. 243). This study agrees that consent is more critical than geography, but maintains that geography does play a part.

One mission factor, impartiality, is often cited as an ingredient for success in peace operations (Urquhart, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Wiseman in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Ratner, 1995; Mackinlay, in Weiss, 1995; Dobbie, 1994; Kaufman, 1996).⁷⁶ Comparing peacekeepers to a referee in a game of rugby, Dobbie (1994) finds that the referee would not long be respected if perceived to favor one team or the other (p. 133). Troops perceived as impartial are more likely to be accepted by the belligerent actors in the conflict, and are less likely to be used as an excuse for reinitiating or continuing the conflict.

The loss of the perception of impartiality on the part of the belligerent parties potentially could lead to loss of consent (Durch, 1993). To create and maintain the perception, impartiality must characterize all levels of the operation from the Security Council mandate to the behavior of the peacekeepers in the field.⁷⁷ In an effort to preclude perceptions of partiality, permanent members of the Security Council have not historically provided forces for peace operations.⁷⁸ In addition, to avoid any perceptions of bias, the UN has avoided troop contingents from states with an interest in the conflict and sought equitable geographic representation of the national contingents that make up the force. In some cases,

⁷⁶ It is important to point out the mixed uses of the terms “impartiality” and “neutrality” in the literature. The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably and used to imply specific characteristics of an operation (see for example Wiseman, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990, pp. 41-47). I see utility in conceptual clarity and will use impartiality throughout.

⁷⁷ Addressing impartiality and neutrality, Wiseman describes impartiality as imperative: “Impartiality is not only a principled requirement of UN peacekeeping operations, it must also be perceived as such by the parties in conflict and actively expressed in word and deed by the Permanent Members” (Wiseman, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, p. 43).

⁷⁸ See Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek (1990), for the role of troops from Security Council members (pp. 65-66).

the contingents as well as the force commander have been subject to the approval of the host nation (International Peace Academy, 1984; Murray, in Wiseman, 1983). It should be noted that these maxims have not been rigidly adhered to since 1988.

What is the role of impartiality in peace enforcement operations where consent is deteriorating or totally lacking? Some advance the view that there are three options regarding impartiality when consent is absent (Betts, 1994).⁷⁹ The first is to allow (or assist) one side to defeat the other and impose its will, speeding up peace by subjugation, an obvious renouncement of impartiality.⁸⁰ The second option is limited impartial intervention in which the intervening force is not strong enough to overpower the belligerents, the cost-benefit equation that sparked the conflict in the first place doesn't change and, consequently, belligerents are not motivated to settle their differences. The final alternative is impartial interventions using massive force (imperial or "harsh" impartiality) to overpower both sides and impose a settlement (pp. 20-21).

I argue that the UN would be better off narrowing its options to two—impartial peacekeeping with limited force in interstate wars where consent exists, and imperial or harsh

⁷⁹ Zacarias (1996) also suggests impartiality may "complicate rather than simplify peace operations" but provides little in the way of alternatives except to suggest that impartiality rules be revised (p. 161).

⁸⁰ This steps beyond Copley (1997), Krauthammer (1995), and Luttwak (1995/1999), who as noted above, suggest avoiding intervention in favor of simply allowing wars to burn out. Here, the focus is on actually intervening to assist one side to achieve victory. Some (i.e., Ratner, 1995) suggest that peace enforcement operations by their very nature favor one side against another and never require impartiality. An intervention designed, for example, to prevent human rights abuses, will always take sides and be partial.

impartiality via peace enforcement in civil wars where it doesn't.⁸¹ In any case, whether consent exists, is deteriorating, or absent, impartiality is important. Punishing violators of law and order equally regardless of the level of consent maintains impartiality. As a result, I hypothesize that the potential for success in peace operations will be lowest where impartiality is low and highest when high.⁸²

Many researchers find the second mission factor, command and control arrangements, to be a contributor to the success or failure of peace operations (Durch, 1993b; Diehl, 1994; Alberts & Hayes, 1995; Murray, in Wiseman, 1983).⁸³ Bifurcated command relations or faulty communications can lead to confusion regarding mandated objectives and breakdowns of unified effort, resulting in unnecessary military and civilian fatalities and an inability to gain objectives. In peace operations where command relationships at the UN are often ambiguous, forces are multinational, and operations are often mixed civilian and military efforts, these problems are all too frequent.

UN peace operation forces are directed by a chain of command that runs from the Security Council to the Secretary-General through a force commander to the lowest troop level. Despite improvements in the organizational structure handling peace operations at the

⁸¹ It is interesting to note the much earlier work of Forsythe (1969) in regards to impartiality. He, like Betts, concludes that complete impartiality is not a reasonable goal in many peace operations. He states that the "Charter itself indicates a preference for certain values" (he mentions human rights and peace) and UN action to enforce those values in a context that does not embrace them makes it partial (pp. 127-128).

⁸² Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek (1990) suggests impartiality as "the most important rule in peacekeeping" (p. 65). I disagree and argue that consent is the most important.

⁸³ UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali commented, "Today's first major challenge is command and coordination" (Boutros-Ghali, quoted by Paschall in Benton, 1996, p. 57).

UN, commanders may receive orders from any of a variety of UN departments in New York.⁸⁴ The consequence is multiple or unclear objectives handed down to the force commander by headquarters. This problem is made worse by the possible existence of civil agencies concerned with humanitarian or other concerns, over which the UN commander has no control whatsoever.

At the force level, peace operation forces are multi-national with troop contingents from a wide array of contributing states. Within this multi-national coalition, national military components often turn to their home government for guidance with serious consequences for the operation (Alberts & Hayes, 1995; Durch, 1993b; Berdal, 1996; Zacarias, 1996; Mackinlay, in Weiss, 1995; Findlay, 1996⁸⁵). Differences in command rules between national contingents can also lead to loss of efficiency as a coherent force. In addition, peace operations often experience language barriers between the contingents, their force commander, and each other, a situation potentially exacerbated by a lack of trained translators.

The impact of cumbersome command and control procedures, troublesome in peacekeeping operations, has an increased potential for negative consequences in peace enforcement operations. The potential use of force in a context lacking the consent of the

⁸⁴ This point is made clearly by Berdal (1996).

⁸⁵ Findlay (1996), pointing to the tendency of national contingents to "call home" rather than to take orders directly from the commander of the operation, gives several egregious examples from recent peace operations, including the Japanese contingent in Cambodia, which had to clear virtually every UN order with Tokyo before compliance (p. 23). Mackinlay, in Weiss (1995), suggests, "the commander is trapped between the Secretary-General above, who exercises command over the commander as a UN official, and the national contingents below" (p. 64).

actors places far greater demands upon the command and control mechanism than an operation based upon consent. Operations in an environment of consent do not require the elaborate equipment and procedural expertise required for operations where the use of force may be required.⁸⁶

There are those who believe that command and control difficulties have had only a negligible impact upon peace operation success (Diehl, 1994; Allen, 1996). From this view, command and control difficulties can dampen the efficiency of operations but have little or no influence upon outcome. I disagree with this assessment. Faulty command relations that do not provide clear objectives, faulty communications facilities and procedures that do not assist rapid and accurate communications, or national contingents that delay implementation of command directives while awaiting approval from state authorities, can lead to fatalities and an inability to gain objectives.

Accordingly, I argue that the level of effectiveness of the command and control arrangements is a contributor to the success or failure of peace operations. If command and control arrangements are efficient, the operation will be capable of focusing its efforts upon clear objectives, consequently limiting casualties and completing its mandate. Operations with cumbersome command and control arrangements are likely to suffer confusion regarding its objectives and find it difficult or impossible to focus the efforts of the national contingents making up the multinational force. The consequences are an increased potential for fatalities and difficulty attaining mandated objectives. The hypothesis states that the potential for

⁸⁶ See Raevsky (in Thakur & Thayer, 1995, pp. 193-206) for a thorough discussion of command and control in peace enforcement.

success in peace operations will increase as the level of effectiveness of the command and control system increases.

The final mission factor, size of the peace operation military force, is suggested as a factor influencing the success of peace operations (Skjelsbaek, 1989; Green, Kahl, & Diehl, 1998b). Insufficient numbers may lead to a stalemated operation unable to establish its legitimacy or respond to violence. Force size may well compensate for other factors, such as geography and type of conflict, in influencing the outcome of a peace operation.

Skjelsbaek (1989) quotes a UN commander's remark that, "no military commander will ever be completely satisfied with the number of troops at his disposal" (p. 259). While this is a truism, an inadequately manned operation may be unable to prevent the reemergence of conflict in peacekeeping operations or to quell bloodshed in peace enforcement operations. Inadequate size can thus lead to the failure of a peace operation to terminate conflict, facilitate conflict resolution, limit casualties, or obtain mandated objectives.

The necessary size of a peace operation is relative to the environment it is asked to operate within. The more difficult the operation, the larger the force must be. Factors such as conflict type and geography will impact force size, as forces deployed into intrastate wars and/or difficult geography require larger forces to fulfill mandate objectives. Small forces deployed into these situations are more prone to failure.

In view of these considerations, I anticipate that force size will influence the level of success of peace operations. If forces are adequately manned, the operation will be capable of accomplishing its mandated objectives. Operations with inadequate manning will be unable to complete its objectives. I hypothesize that the potential for success in peace operations will increase as the size of the force increases.

Political Factors

Political factors concentrate on those variables that are within the purview of the UN, the Security Council, and the member states to control. The implication is that the quality of the guidance and support given to operations can influence the outcome positively or negatively. Clear guidance by the authorizing agency, whether the Security Council or General Assembly, and support of the operation by the great powers are factors with implications for the relative success of peace operations.

The first political factor, UN mandates, is a variable often pointed to as a source of success or failure in peace operations (Murray, in Wiseman, 1983; Durch, 1993b; Berdal, 1993; Diehl, 1994; Zacarias, 1996). The mandate sets the purpose and the goals for the peace operation, and sometimes provides deployment plans and duties to be performed. A clear and detailed mandate is especially critical to the force commander of the peace operation who must extract the objectives for the force from the mandate. However, it also establishes what the peace operation will do in the area for others. Clear and identified goals and duties will help set expectations for the public in troop contributing nations and in the nation where the operation will take place. In addition, the military and political actors in the nation where the operation will take place know what the operation's goals are.

Yet as noted, mandates are often vague and imprecise. Consequently, force commanders have had difficulty in identifying precise objectives for their peace forces. This potentially leads to difficulty in providing clear direction to the force, especially in cases where unclear mandates have led to misunderstandings about goals and limitations between national contingents making up a peace operation. Potential misunderstandings can also occur between force commanders and the UN.

The Security Council recognizes the need for clear and concise political goals and mandates, as well as the tasks mandates call for to be concise and appropriate to the situation.⁸⁷ Yet this acknowledgment must operate within a Security Council constituted by representatives from individual states, each with their own national interests. Since mandates reflect the level of interest of the great powers in the Security Council, an ambiguous mandate may simply mirror a divergence of great power interests resolved by compromise.⁸⁸ The potential for unfailingly clear, concise mandates as a guide to force commander objectives is slight given these issues.⁸⁹

Some propose that mandate ambiguity may actually contribute potential for success in that a vague mandate may encourage political support from nations who do not wish to appear to be endorsing specific actions, and may allow military commanders discretion and freedom in how to conduct their operations (Durch, 1993b). I disagree with this point of

⁸⁷ Among factors to be considered when considering new operations, the Security Council lists whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate, and whether a precise mandate for a UN operation can be formulated (U.N. Document S/PRST/1994/22, available: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm>).

⁸⁸ Durch (1993b) proposes that this divergence of interest may really be the culprit to blame when an operation goes awry, not the mandate reflecting it. Zacarias (1996) agrees, stating, “Convergence of interests has not always been possible in some operations, and the mandate of an operation or what the disputants expect of the UN as neutral and impartial intervener is not always clear. These are the main variables of success or failure” (p. 205). This is examined under political factors.

⁸⁹ Berdal (1993) succinctly captures the problem: “Security Council mandates, by their very nature, will continue to reflect a measure of political compromise among member-states and are therefore unlikely ever fully to satisfy military demands for ‘an unambiguous mission statement’. But the political aspirations which a mandate embodies must be capable of translation into a set of realizable military objectives” (p. 31). Ruggie, in Pugh (1997), agrees, adding that recent operations have been especially problematical in this regard (p. 14).

view. Mandate clarity is essential if force commanders are to know what they are expected to do, and if all actors are to interpret the mandate in the same way. Vague mandates do not contribute to success. They make it difficult to put political objectives into operational terms and leave the objectives open to many interpretations, actually contributing to failure.⁹⁰

The mandate issued by the Security Council must be capable of establishing attainable military objectives, and of informing populations and other actors of the purpose, goals and duties for the peace operation, eliminating uncertainty and misunderstandings. I hypothesize that clear, concise mandates will increase the probability of success while vague, ambiguous mandates will not.

The next political factor commonly cited as a variable influencing the outcome of peace operations is the involvement of the great powers, defined as the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the P-5) (Lee, Paginhardt, & Stanley, 1992; Durch, 1993b; Diehl, 1994; Bratt, 1997; Green, Kahl, & Diehl, 1998a/b).⁹¹ Great power support is not only essential to the

⁹⁰ Norton and Weiss, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek (1990), reporting on a peace operation workshop, note the participants calling on the need to clarify mandates. Rikhye & Skjelsbaek (1990) state, "Their 'woolly' nature had led to a situation in which there were too many and too controversial operational decisions in the field" (p. 29).

⁹¹ There is a wide variety of terms used to describe this concept. Diehl (1994) uses "superpowers," limiting the concept to the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. Green, Kahl, & Diehl (1994) follow suit. This unfortunately limits analysis of this important concept to only two powers and only the Cold War period. Bratt (1997) suggests the permanent members of the Security Council, a much more useful term. Durch (1993) uses "great powers" but doesn't define the term, although he implies that he means the Security Council. This study will use the term "great powers" to indicate the Permanent Five of the Security Council.

authorization of a mission in the Security Council, but is also indispensable to the mandates, finances, and provision of forces that ensure its continued operation and potential success.

During the Cold War, the rivalry between the two superpowers stymied great power Security Council action in the form of peace operations.⁹² The Security Council, designed to respond to aggression by unified action in the form of collective security, had been split by East-West Cold War tensions. Peace operations could not effectively intervene in conflicts within the orbits of the superpowers, but were limited to those conflicts on the periphery of superpower interests.⁹³

At the end of the Cold War, the changing nature of international politics at the great power level was the catalyst for the changes in number and nature of peace operations undertaken by the UN (Durch, 1993b; Christie, in Thakur & Thayer, 1995; Mingst & Karns, 1995). For a period of time, the interests of the great powers seemed to coincide.⁹⁴ Yet this consensus has wavered, as great power abstention and threatened vetoes, and actual vetoes on key peace operation votes in the Security Council indicate that harmony has once again given way to contention among the members of the Security Council.

⁹² Many suggest that the breakdown of collective security as a consequence of Cold War tensions in the Security Council led to the creation of peace operations as the UN searched for ways to maintain relevancy. In fact, the terms peacekeeping or peace operations do not appear in the Charter. See Claude (1971); Mingst & Karns (1995); Durch (1993); Christie, in Thakur & Thayer (1995).

⁹³ In fact, Claude (1971) suggested that UN intervention, by operating in areas outside the sphere of Cold War struggles, could contain the Cold War (pp. 312-313).

⁹⁴ The decline in veto use demonstrated this unity. See Roberts (in Crocker et al., 1998, pp. 299-300).

Beyond the role of the great powers in authorizing a peace operation, this group wields a combination of financial, military and political power unlike that of other states in the world political system.⁹⁵ While the General Assembly approves peace operation financing, it is the great powers that are assessed most of the expense. As such, they possess great influence over overall operation costs. In addition, the great powers possess the military capabilities needed by peace operations, either in troops, support capabilities, or both, and can choose whether to deploy them in support of an operation. Finally, the great powers can express through their political commitment to the operation their unwillingness to countenance intransigence on the part of belligerent actors, and can pressure other states to increase support to the operation or, conversely, discontinue support to the belligerents.

I find the support of the great powers crucial to a successful peace operation. Without it, even if the operation were to receive authorization, its successful conclusion would be at risk. Great power influence over financing, the capacity of their military forces, and the influence of great power political commitment can be essential to a successful outcome. Accordingly, I hypothesize that high levels of great power support will increase successful outcomes.

These three sets of factors, contextual, mission and political, and their associated variables, determine the degree of peace operation success. Table 1 summarizes the hypothesized effects of each factor upon success:

⁹⁵ Some (Durch, 1993; Allen, 1996; Bratt, 1997; Green, Kahl, & Diehl, 1998) suggest the involvement of the United States as the sole remaining superpower may give the U.S. a disproportionate impact upon post-Cold War peacekeeping, an impact that could potentially be either positive or detrimental.

Table 1:
Summary of Hypotheses

VARIABLES	HYPOTHEZIZED IMPACT
Contextual Factors	
Demonstrated Actor Consent	+ **
Type of Conflict	
Interstate Conflict	+
Civil Conflict (baseline)	0
Internationalized Civil Conflict	—
Area	—
Location Type	—
Additional Location	—
Number of Borders	—
Mission factors	
Impartial Force	+ *
Efficient Command and Control	+
Adequate Force Size	+
Political Factors	
Clear and Concise Mandate	+
High Great Power Support	+ *

Notes. + Positive effect; 0 no effect; — negative effect
 * Hypothesized/Actual strongest effect in category
 ** Hypothesized/Actual strongest effect overall

Comprehending the influence of these factors upon success is essential to a theoretical framework for peace operations. It may also help avoid deployment of operations into inappropriate scenarios that would cost human and material resources. Conversely, identifying the impact of mission and political factors may encourage interventions appropriately designed to increase the potential for success in those peace operations in which we do engage. Recognizing how these variables interact can enrich our understanding by revealing when one factor may compensate for another.

Bratt's success criteria provides an objective measurement standard for the dependent variable, and I have developed a theory of peace operations based upon the independent variables that can influence success, categorized as contextual factors, mission factors and political factors. In order to test these empirical predictions, I must operationally define these variables and delineate how I will collect and measure my observations.

V. Research Design

I will conduct an empirical test on forty-six missions classified as peace operations by the UN commencing between 1945 and 1997. The peace operations analyzed here are listed Appendix A, along with the year of deployment, the year of completion (where applicable), and their success rating. The list does not include operations authorized by the UN but commanded by a major power or regional organization, such as those sanctioned by the UN in Korea and Kuwait.⁹⁶

The measurement of the dependent variable, the degree of success of peace operations, is extracted from Bratt (1997). The results of the combined measurements are categorized as failure, moderate success, or complete success, and will be coded as 1, 2, or 3, respectively. I extended Bratt's data by determining the success rating for all operations through 1997.⁹⁷

For the independent variables that influence success, I examined existing data from Green, Kahl, and Diehl's new Peacekeeping Operations data set (1998a/b).⁹⁸ They use their data set to support statistical models to predict size and fiscal costs of peace operations. I used several variables relevant to this study from their data set, including type of conflict, geographic considerations, type of mission, and force size.

⁹⁶ Korea and Kuwait were authorized by the UN but were not under the command of the UN. Accordingly, the UN does not consider them peace operations.

⁹⁷ Bratt approves the extension of the data from his earlier 1997 study. E-mail from Bratt dated 25 April 2000.

⁹⁸ This data set is available at <http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/diehl.html>

For conflict type, Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b) define as civil conflicts those confined within the boundaries of one state and involving only one or no state actors, and code these conflicts as a 1. They label interstate conflicts as those in which the primary disputants were comprised exclusively of states, coding these as 2. Finally, they identify as internationalized civil conflicts those in which primary disputants include two or more state actors and subnational actors, and code these as 3.

Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b) measure geographic factors with three separate indicators with nominal or ratio levels of measurement. They use the square mileage of territory within which the force was deployed or responsible for monitoring to measure geographic size of the operation. I recoded this information, breaking the data into three categories. Cases with square mileage of territory between 0 and 7800 square miles are assigned a 1, cases with square mileage between 7801 and 50,000 are assigned a 2, and cases with square mileage over 50,000 are assigned a 3.

Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b) code the next geographic factor, location type, into one of four categories: urban terrain (major city) is coded as 1; rural terrain (nonmountainous, temperate, thinly populated) is coded as 2; difficult terrain (jungle, mountains) is coded as 3; and island terrain is coded as 4. They use the most predominant deployment terrain facing the peace operation to determine the coding.

A case that qualifies as “multiple locations” by demonstrating either (a) multiple deployment areas of different terrains or (b) single deployment areas with multiple terrains is coded as 1. All other cases are coded as 0. The last geographic factor used by Green, Kahl, and Diehl is the total number of internationally recognized land borders for the state(s) in which the force was deployed.

Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b) measure the maximum number of troops deployed for each mission using a ratio measure of force size. For observer missions, the number of military observers is used if available. In cases where it is not possible to distinguish between military and civilian observers, both are counted. For post-Cold War missions, they include military police in deployment figures but not civilian police forces, typically used for training purposes only. They use the maximum number allowed by the mandate if actual deployment figures are not available. I recoded this information, breaking the data into three categories. Cases with a force size of 0 to 400 are assigned a 1, cases with a force size of 401 to 4000 are assigned a 2, and cases with a force size over 4,000 are assigned a 3.

Green, Kahl, and Diehl's data set does not include variables on consent, force impartiality, command and control, and mandate.⁹⁹ I operationalize the level of consent by measuring the observance by all parties of any cease-fire provisions, the number of actor attacks against opponents or peace operation troops, and the number of actor actions that might threaten opponents or peace operation troops (such as troop build-ups or other threatening behavior).¹⁰⁰ I agree with Grünigen (in Cassese, 1978) that consent must be

⁹⁹ Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b) provide data for great power involvement, but as noted above, limit it to the United States and the Soviet Union, and limit it to the Cold War era. This study intends to develop data based upon the Permanent Five of the Security Council from 1945 to present.

¹⁰⁰ Berger (1983) has suggested a method of aggregating case studies. This technique, the case survey method, involves analyzing case studies, aggregating the various case experiences, and then making generalizations. As Berger states, "Until now, the main limitation of isolated, one-shot case studies was that the insights from the various cases could not be aggregated in any systematic manner. The case survey overcomes this problem by integrating the individual studies via conventional statistics" (p. 309). I follow Berger's case survey method, although I also augment my research by source documents to avoid secondary analysis.

extended for the entire operation. Consequently, consent withdrawn prior to the completion of the operation or the failure of parties to consent to a change in mandate during the operation shall be reflected accordingly.¹⁰¹ I evaluate the level of consent demonstrated by both state and non-state parties as suggested by Wiseman (1983) and Liu (1992). Each of the indicators is weighted equally, as are indicators for all remaining variables, and the case survey method will be used throughout. Consent is measured as low, medium, or high, and coded as 1, 2, or 3, respectively.

My first force impartiality indicator is the composition of the peace operation force. I judge whether the operation represented equitable geographic representation, and if it avoided troop contingents from states with an interest in the conflict. I also consider whether members of the permanent five from the Security Council contributed troops to the operation. My second indicator weighs the actions of the force, particularly if inadvertent or intentional actions were taken that demonstrated a bias for or against one of the belligerents in the conflict. Finally, I take into consideration UN actions as an indicator of impartiality, analyzing whether the Security Council mandate implies a bias toward one of the belligerents. Impartiality is also measured as low, medium, or high, and coded as 1, 2, or 3, respectively.

Indicators for command and control include whether a single or multiple lines of command extend from the Secretary General to the peace operation, whether translators were

¹⁰¹ Grünigen, in Cassese (1978), states, "The consent must be assured for the whole duration of the presence of the Force. Otherwise, the operation would inevitably acquire some aspects of a coercive action. The consent does not only expire when the host State withdraws it....It would be the same if the consent were only given for a limited period of time and the host State refused to prolong it. Furthermore, an enlargement or any other modification of the mandate of the Force during the operation would also need the consent, at least tacit, of the host State (p. 136).

assigned to units whose primary language differs from the force commander's, whether national contingents habitually request and defer to host nation instructions in lieu of the force commander's, and whether the command and control system is buttressed by technological assistance. Command and control is measured as ineffective, partially effective, or effective, and coded as 1, 2, or 3, respectively.

I include the number of mandates issued by the Security Council for a particular operation as a mandate indicator. A high number may reflect poor mandate construction in the initial attempts, and a high number with shifting goals will exponentially complicate a force commander's job. In addition, I include whether realizable objectives were outlined in the mandate. Since UN resolutions providing the mandate for any given operation often refer to and build upon previous peace agreements and Secretary-General Reports, these will be examined also. Mandate is measured as ineffective, partially effective, or effective, and coded as 1, 2, or 3, respectively.

I operationalize great power support by modifying indicators suggested by Haas (1983).¹⁰² Haas ranks support as none, weak, wide, or very wide. For a ranking of none, a resolution was not passed and no action was taken by the organization. Since I concentrate upon operations actually authorized by the Security Council, this measure does not apply. Instead, a ranking of none shall be assigned those peace operations initiated by the General Assembly after transfer from a deadlocked Security Council. I will utilize Haas's weak, wide, and very wide ratings. He gives a rating of weak when a member of the Security Council

¹⁰² Haas (1983) uses the terms "consensus" instead of great power support, includes organizations other than the UN, and includes the superpowers and other powers (pp. 239-240).

abstained and there is a question about whether the abstention was in lieu of a veto. For a rating of wide, he judges abstentions as acquiescence to the operation. His very wide rating requires all unanimous votes (with no abstentions or absences). In the case of a peace operation authorized by the General Assembly without initial action by the Security Council, the votes of the great powers on the Assembly resolution shall be examined in accordance with the above criteria. Accordingly, I will measure great power support as none, weak, wide, and very wide, and code them as 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively.

I employed a long-established means of analysis for assessing the simultaneous impact of the independent variables: the general linear, multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.¹⁰³ This methodology allows the incorporation of both quantitative and qualitative (dummy) variables, and the results are easily interpretable for analysis.

Now that I have operationally defined my independent variables, and collected data through the use of both existing information and measures of observations using the case survey method, it is time to subject my hypothesis to empirical testing. In the next chapter, I summarize the results of my testing and assess whether my hypotheses were supported.

¹⁰³ This model is aptly described by Ott (1988, pp. 474-539), who points out that this model can be used for cases in which "y" is related to both qualitative and quantitative variables. Ordinary least squares (sometimes called criterion of least squares, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996) will be used to bring error of prediction to minimum.

VI. Empirical Findings

In this chapter, I empirically test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter.

First, I examine the raw data for accuracy. Second, I perform a bivariate analysis to determine if there are any initial indications of relationships that might exist between paired variables.

Third, I conduct a multivariate analysis to determine which independent variables have an affect on the dependent variable. Finally, I offer a conclusion to my empirical findings.

I began by examining the raw data to confirm its accuracy (see Appendix B and Appendix C).¹⁰⁴ I next performed a bivariate analysis by regressing each independent variable upon success and upon every other independent variable. By regressing each independent variable upon success, I was able to determine whether the signs on the coefficients were in the direction I hypothesized and whether they were significant. The signs on the coefficients of the independent variables were all in the hypothesized direction. I found consent, mandate, and impartiality significantly correlated with success at the .05 level:

Table 2:
Bivariate Correlations

Variable	Covaried With:	Correlation W/Success
Consent	Mandate (.55020)	.75270
Mandate	Consent (.55020)	.57288
Impartiality	Consent (0.41289) Mandate (0.46819)	.37190

¹⁰⁴ DOMREP, the operation in the Dominican Republic deployed in 1965 to observe America's military intervention, was clearly counter to the trend. With a force size of only 2 and U.S. consent to UN oversight not forthcoming, this is understandable.

Regressing each independent variable upon every other independent variable indicated if any independent variables covaried with another. The reader will note that the three variables are highly intercorrelated, consent and mandate with each other and impartiality with both consent and mandate. This is the first indication that the variables may explain the same unexplained variance, a situation shown later to be true. Great power support, command and control, impartiality, conflict type, and geographic variables (area, location type, additional locations, and number of borders) were not significantly correlated with success.

This bivariate significance test for Pearson's *r* assumes measurement on at least an interval scale (parametric), but my data is ordinal (nonparametric). Thus, while Pearson's *r* is a good indicator of initial trends and direction, a nonparametric test will produce a better indication of the real strength of the relationships. Accordingly, I utilized the chi-square test (two way contingency tables) to confirm the existence and strength of the bivariate relationships suggested by Pearson's *r*. Three of the eleven variables were significant at the .05 significance level:

Table 3
Frequency Table Summary

VARIABLE	DF	CHI-SQUARE	PROB
CONSENT (CONSENT)	4	26.6490	<.0001
MANDATE (MAND)	4	18.7019	<.0009
CONFLICT TYPE (CONTYPE)	4	11.4769	<.0217

Success shows significant dependence on consent, mandate, and conflict type. Impartiality, significant when using the Pearson's *r* parametric test, is insignificant when using the more appropriate nonparametric chi-square test.¹⁰⁵

While variables appear significant, there is always the possibility that bivariate tests may show relationships that are the product of chance or exist because the variables are related to a third undiscovered variable. In other words, the relationship between any single independent variable and the dependent variable may be due to the fact that they are both associated with a third variable. More than a single independent variable also allows for the use of control. For these reasons, I conducted multivariate analysis by introducing additional variables through regression.

My use of a trichotomous dependent variable in a regression model does present a concern. The regression model assumes that the measurement of the independent variables is ordinal. The dependent variable, however, is assumed to be continuous. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) point out that if the independent variable is dichotomous and can take on only two values, the assumption of continuous interval measurement has been violated. Linearity may be impacted and the results of data analysis may be influenced.¹⁰⁶

Bartels and Brady (Finifter, 1993) contest the validity of Aldrich and Nelson's conclusions. They assert that political scientists are needlessly using logit or probit to avoid

¹⁰⁵ It is curious that impartiality was significant when using Pearson's *r* test but insignificant when using the chi-square test. Although this shift may be partially due to use of the chi-square test, it is also quite possible that both impartiality and conflict type are so highly intercorrelated with consent and mandate that there is no distinguishing between them.

¹⁰⁶ Although Aldrich and Nelson (1984) are addressing a dichotomous dependent variable and I used a trichotomous variable, their concern applies to some degree to my study.

Aldrich and Nelson's concerns when, "In practice, these three methods [logit, probit, and linear regression via ordinary least squares (OLS)] often produce very similar results, and the OLS model has the great virtue of being easy to estimate and to interpret" (p. 131). I rely primarily upon linear regression, but use logit and probit to reinforce the validity of my findings.

I analyzed the variables using all possible regressions for nine terms to find the best possible single model. I combined the consent and mandate variables as a single variable, CNSNTMDT, because they are intercorrelated. Table 4 indicates the model containing the fewest independent variables and producing the largest R^2 is the one term model consent*mandate:

Table 4:
Multiple Regression Of Success Rating

Number in		Root		
Model	R-Square	C (p)	MSE	Variables in Model
1	0.6074	-5.5158	0.29951	CNSNTMDT
1	0.5666	-1.8289	0.33063	CONSENT
1	0.5595	-1.1912	0.33601	CNSTSQ

The consent*mandate model accounted for 60.74 per cent of the variance and is the best of all models. I did not display terms two through nine since adding additional terms, including both impartiality and type of conflict, did not significantly increase the ability of the model to explain unexplained variance.

Finally, I used OLS to test the consent*mandate model's fit to the actual data. The empirical results are shown in Table 5:

Table 5:
Least Squares; Success Rate On The Consent*Mandate Interaction

R-Square	0.6074	Adj R-Square	0.5982
F Value	66.51	Pr>F	<.0001
Parameter Estimates for CNSNTMDT			
t Value	8.16	Pr>t	<.0001


R-Square and the more conservative R-Square adjusted for degrees of freedom are unusually close to each other and provide an indication of a good fit. They show that the model explains approximately 60 percent of the total variation.

Both F Value and t Value are significant, demonstrating that the model does explain a considerable portion of the variation in the data.¹⁰⁷ These values are a measure of how many units the dependent variable is expected to change for a one-unit change in the regressor variable. The null hypothesis for both, that the F and t Values will be zero (H^0 : Parameter = 0) indicating no dependent variable change upon a regressor variable change, is disproven. Both F Value and t Value demonstrate a very low probability that the F or *t* statistic could obtain a greater absolute value than that observed if the H^0 were true.

My analysis clearly indicates that consent and mandate are the only significant variables explaining the degree of success of peace operations. Figure 1 summarizes the correlation between the consent*mandate model and success:

¹⁰⁷ The *t* statistic is a measure of change based upon standard error.

Figure 1:
Predicted success rating as a function of consent and mandate



As can be seen, when consent and mandate are at their lowest (1), the probability of success is also at its lowest. Conversely, when consent and mandate are at their highest (3), the probability of success is also high. By plotting values for consent and mandate, I can interpolate the probability of success.

As will be recalled (see Table 6), I hypothesized that three categories of independent variables, contextual factors, political factors, and mission factors, would affect success. I hypothesized that one of the variables within each category would be most important in that category, and that one of the variables from all three categories would be most important overall:

Table 6:
Summary of Hypotheses Versus Empirical Results

VARIABLES	HYPOTHEZIZED IMPACT	ACTUAL IMPACT
Contextual Factors		
Demonstrated Actor Consent	+ **	+ **
Type of Conflict		
Interstate Conflict	+	0
Civil Conflict (baseline)	0	0
Internationalized Civil Conflict	-	0
Area	-	0
Location Type	-	0
Additional Location	-	0
Number of Borders	-	0
Mission factors		
Impartial Force	+ *	0
Efficient Command and Control	+	0
Adequate Force Size	+	0
Political Factors		
Clear and Concise Mandate	+	+ *
High Great Power Support	+ *	0

Notes. + positive effect; 0 no effect; - negative effect
 * Hypothesized/Actual strongest effect in category
 ** Hypothesized/Actual strongest effect overall

As can be seen, the actual impact of a number of these variables was quite different from my expectations. This has significant implications for the scholarly literature covering peace operations.

As noted earlier, consent is frequently cited as the single most important variable leading to a successful peace operation (Berdal, 1993; Durch, 1993b; Dobbie, 1994; Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Kaufman, 1996; Bratt, 1997). Wiseman (1983) and Liu (1992) also pointed out that the level of consent of non-state parties involved (i.e., internal factions, liberation movements, and irregular armed elements) is as important as that of governments. I described consent as the permission of all parties concerned for the deployment and continued functioning of the peace operation. I hypothesized consent as the most significant both within its category and overall; the results of my analysis confirmed my hypothesis. This demonstrates that the scholarly literature is largely accurate on this point.

The importance of UN mandates, also often discussed as a source of success or failure (Murray, in Wiseman, 1983; Durch, 1993b; Berdal, 1993; Diehl, 1994; UN, 1994; Zacarias, 1996), is clearly confirmed.¹⁰⁸ My analysis demonstrates that a clear and concise mandate with realizable objectives may in fact increase the level of success even in the face of less than ideal levels of consent. This was the case in the Middle East (UNEF I), Namibia (UNTAG), Iraq and Kuwait (UNIKOM), El Salvador (ONUSAL), UNTAC (Cambodia), and

¹⁰⁸ Among factors to be weighed when considering new operations, the Security Council listed whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate, and whether a precise mandate for a UN operation can be formulated (U.N. Document S/PRST/1994/22, available: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm>).

Mozambique (ONUMOZ).¹⁰⁹ A Security Council mandate that is clear, concise, and provides realizable objectives for the operation will contribute to success. Vague and ambiguous mandates will not. This has strong implications for those who have proposed that mandate ambiguity may actually be beneficial (Durch, 1993b: 28).

Unexpectedly, all other variables proved insignificant. A few were especially surprising and deserve comment. I as well as others hypothesized that type of conflict would have an influence on success (Diehl, 1994; Weiss, 1995; Skjelsbaek, 1989; Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Liu, 1992; Berdal, 1993; King, 1997). As peace operations have shifted toward dealing with more intrastate conflict since 1988, I suggested that the characteristics of intrastate conflict would leave these internal disagreements resistant to resolution. The internationalization of intrastate conflict, the numerous armed factions characteristic of these wars, the highly charged belligerent emotions, and incompatible communal values and identities seemed likely to make compromise and settlement a very difficult goal to reach.

Consequently, the finding that the consent*mandate model explained success more completely than type of conflict is thought provoking.¹¹⁰ James (1995) takes up a discussion on internal missions versus those that operate at a border that may lead us to discover why this is so. He tests two common ideas—that the post-cold war shift to civil wars and their

¹⁰⁹ In two cases, the Kashmir (UNIPOM) and Central America (ONUCA), consent was measured higher than mandate, and in both cases, the level of consent determined the outcome.

¹¹⁰ It is interesting to note that Green et al. (1998a/b) argued that the type of conflict had no significant influence on either the cost or size of force for peace operations.

inhospitable environment is causing failure, and that intrastate conflict is harder to resolve because the operations are simply much more complex. He finds both ideas to be untrue.¹¹¹

Looking beyond James' finding, however, one finds measures of consent and mandate to be relatively high in all operations involving civil war and internationalized civil war that were partially or completely successful.¹¹² Conversely, measures of consent and mandate were low in all operations involving civil war and internationalized civil war that were failures.¹¹³ In other words, just like peace operations in interstate wars, peace operations in civil conflicts are not doomed if they enjoy a high level of consent and an effective mandate.

The impartiality variable has also received substantial attention as an ingredient for success in peace operations (Urquhart, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Wiseman in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Ratner, 1995; Mackinlay, in Weiss, 1995; Dobbie, 1994; Kaufman, 1996). I hypothesized impartiality to be strongest within its category. Yet impartiality, like type of conflict, offered no explanation for success that the consent*mandate model didn't already provide. The scholarly literature advocating impartiality must reconsider its importance relative to consent and mandate.

¹¹¹ It is clear that post-cold war peace operations have mostly dealt with internal conflict, but more than half of the cold war peace operations were internal conflict. This is not, according to James (1995), a paradigmatic shift. He also notes that the greater complexity of internal mission does not mean they are doomed, and concludes that, "it can respectfully be maintained that an internal environment does not always prove operationally uncongenial for peacekeepers" (p. 244).

¹¹² The mean for all civil and internationalized civil conflict was 2.61 for consent and 2.92 for mandate.

¹¹³ The mean for all failed operations in civil and internationalized civil conflict was 1.18 for consent and 1.81 for mandate.

The literature covering peace operations has been consistently vague and unsystematic, with little development of theory using hypothesis testing. The result has been disarray as each scholar has speculated as to the variables they believe are truly critical to the success of peace operations. I developed a theory of peace operations, conducted a systematic empirical study of all peace operations, and isolated the variables that influence success. The consent*mandate model explained 60.74 percent of variance in success. No other variables tested offered such a high explanatory power singly or combined. It is apparent that an operation fielded with the consent of the parties and an effective mandate has the greatest probability of success regardless of the presence or absence of other factors. I now turn to an examination of a peace operation still in its early stages to apply the model in a prognostic approach.

VII. The Future of The Congo

The preceding chapters have proposed and tested a theoretical framework for peace operations. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was selected as a prognostic case study in which to apply the developed model. As a neophyte peace operation only created by the Security Council on 24 February 2000, it provides a rich opportunity to apply a theory of peace operations in a predictive capacity to an operation still to be played out.

This chapter will review the historical development of the conflict in the Congo to provide a solid framework for analysis. Then, using the conditions existing in the Congo, the variables of consent and mandate will be measured and a prediction of the outcome of MONUC will be made.

Synopsis

After Belgium granted Congo its independence in 1960, a UN Operation in the Former Belgian Congo (ONUC) was fielded to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces. However, ONUC became increasingly controversial as it dealt with severe great power friction over expectations for the operation and acute financial problems that nearly bankrupted the UN, all in the context of a succession and violent civil war. ONUC finally withdrew in June 1964 after helping hold the Congo together, but the UN had been traumatized by its first-ever intervention in a chaotic internal crisis.

The departure of ONUC did not end the political chaos for the Congo. In 1965,

Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu staged a military coup amid a political crisis.¹¹⁴ He named himself president for five years and canceled elections scheduled for 1966. He then adopted a presidential form of government with himself as president. In 1970, Mobutu established his Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) as the sole political party with all citizens obliged to join.

Mobutu changed the name of the country to the Republic of Zaire, changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko, and forced Zairians to Africanize their names and adopt African dress as part of his 1971 Africanization policy. He later instituted a “Zairianization” policy in which he nationalized foreign-owned businesses and gave them to himself and his associates. The Zairian economy fell apart as Mobutu and his circle grew rich by skimming the profits from Zaire’s mineral holdings.

In 1982, opponents of Mobutu’s one-party rule formed the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). Even though Mobutu suppressed the movement throughout the 1980s, by 1990 he was forced by opposition pressure to announce the creation of a multiparty democratic system. He soon reneged on his agreements, however, and returned to authoritarian rule.

This history of authoritarian rule in Zaire was interrupted by the terrible genocide of Tutsi by Hutu in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly 1.3 million ethnic Hutus, including the Hutu Interahamwe militants responsible for Rwanda’s genocidal killings, fled Rwanda’s civil war

¹¹⁴ This was Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu’s second coup. In 1960 Mobutu, then the army’s 29-year-old chief of staff, interceded militarily in a power struggle between President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba. His forces arrested Lumumba and handed him over to Katanga rebels; Lumumba was quickly murdered. Evidence later emerged connecting

and settled in camps in eastern Zaire. Conversely, Tutsis in eastern Zaire revolted when Zaire threatened them in 1996 with expulsion. The Tutsi uprising grew into an anti-Mobutu rebellion led by Laurent Kabila, who had backed Mobutu's rival Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in the first civil war. Kabila's Tutsi-based rebellion drew support from neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. In 1997, Mobutu relinquished power and Kabila declared himself head of state, and changed the country's name back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).¹¹⁵

In August 1998, less than eighteen months after Kabila came to power, fighting again broke out in Congo as rebel forces backed by Kabila's erstwhile allies Rwanda and Uganda attacked Kabila's government. The rebels accused Kabila of stirring ethnic hatred, particularly against Tutsi, the ethnic group now dominating Rwanda's leadership. Even though the rebels appeared to be doing well initially, and seemed ready to march into Kinshasa, Kabila recruited help from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia and turned the tide.

The involvement of numerous states as well as rebel parties led the UN Security Council to call the situation a severe threat to regional peace and security on 31 August 1998.¹¹⁶ On 11 December 1998, the Council suggested it was ready to consider the active

Mobutu and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to Lumumba's murder. Mobutu returned power to Kasavubu in 1961.

¹¹⁵ As Tessitore and Woolfson (1997) state, "Restoration of the Congo's original name seemed ironically appropriate in the spring of 1997, when events suggested that after the 32-year tenure of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who named it Zaire in the 1970s, the situation in the country was just as chaotic as the United Nations found it in the early 1960s" (p. 38).

¹¹⁶ As serious as it is, the war in the DRC is only one of several in the region. As Spears (1999) notes, "An 'arc of conflict' extends from Angola through the two Congos, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia" (p. 563).

involvement of the UN in coordination with the OAU to help implement a ceasefire and an agreed process for a political settlement.

Finally, on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, the DRC, along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement for a cessation of hostilities.¹¹⁷ The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, one of several Congolese rebel movements, signed the Agreement on 1 August, but the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) did not due to questions over whether the RCD-Goma or RCD-Kisangani faction would sign. These questions were finally settled as both RCD factions signed in Lusaka on 31 August.

On 6 August 1999, the Security Council approved the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison personnel, along with a civilian staff, to the capitals of the states that signed the Lusaka Agreement. The personnel also were assigned to the headquarters of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) called for in the Lusaka Agreement and to the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in DRC.¹¹⁸ The small force was to conduct activities designed to prepare the way for a larger anticipated peace operation.

¹¹⁷ The Agreement included provisions on the normalization of the situation along the DRC border; the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups; the holding of a national dialogue; the need to address security concerns; and the establishment of a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups.

¹¹⁸ The JMC was composed of two representatives from each party under a neutral Chairman appointed by the OAU in consultation with the parties. It was to accomplish a number of tasks in the interim before a UN operation was fielded, including facilitating the ceasefire, disarming non-military groups, and monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops (see the 15 July 1999 Report of the Secretary-General, S/1999/790).

In Resolution 1279 passed on 30 November 1999, the Security Council decided to place all previously deployed UN personnel under the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). It also placed MONUC under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It assigned tasks to prepare for eventual deployment of a larger force, and made phased deployment of that force contingent upon party consent. Finally, the Security Council passed Resolution 1291 on 24 February 2000 authorizing up to 5,537 troops for MONUC and expanding the mandated tasks for MONUC. Once again, the Security Council specified that the phased deployment of the greater body of MONUC would only be carried out if the Secretary-General determined that MONUC had the cooperation of the parties.

Unfortunately, numerous violations of the agreement continued. There was fighting ongoing on several fronts, continuing ethnic violence, and repeated denials by Congo of UN requests for access to important sites. The parties were clearly ignoring the ceasefire provisions contained within the Lusaka Agreement. The parties signed a plan in hopes of restarting the Lusaka Agreement on 8 April 2000. It called for a total cessation of hostilities, disengagement of forces to begin 14 April, a secure environment, and UN access and free movement.¹¹⁹

A Security Council delegation traveled in Africa from 4-8 May to discuss methods for ending the Congo conflict with the leaders of countries involved.¹²⁰ It witnessed the signing in

¹¹⁹ On 14 April 2000 a series of violent explosions devastated Kinshasa airport and caused a number of casualties. Responsibility for the explosion has not been determined.

¹²⁰ The mission, led by U.S. Ambassador Holbrooke, also consisted of representatives from Britain, France, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands and Tunisia, all states then sitting on the UN

Kinshasa on May 4 of a long-awaited status of forces agreement for the peace operation. On 8 May the UN mission encouraged Rwanda and Uganda to begin a troop withdrawal from Kisangani, a city in the rich diamond-producing area in eastern Congo they had fought over numerous times.¹²¹ Unfortunately, by 9 May the two forces had resumed fighting over control of the area.¹²² The Council visited the leaders of each state and many of the non-state parties to the conflict, and made it a point to criticize the plunder of diamond and mineral wealth from the DRC.

As of early May the latest ceasefire, then just a month old, was holding reasonably well. Yet both the renewed battle between Rwanda and Uganda for Kisangani and an outbreak of fighting in the northern areas of DRC once again called into question whether the Secretary-General would ever be able to certify the consent of the parties. Any additional MONUC deployment was put on hold once more.

The first Congo operation, ONUC, was the largest, costliest, and most complicated operation for its time. It was a cathartic experience for the UN, leading Durch (1993b, p. 8)

Security Council. The mission's report (document S/2000/416) is available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/mission.pdf>

¹²¹ Uganda's President, Mr. Museveni, said after the talks that tensions with Rwanda were detracting from Ugandan focus on the presence of the Interahamwe in Congo. Part of the agreement calls for Interahamwe reintegration into Rwanda or settlement in a third country. However, Rwanda has effectively exported its militant Hutu problem and doesn't want it back. In addition, if Rwanda and Uganda are really in Congo for the diamonds, gold, and timber, as many suspect, the Interahamwe provide a good excuse for being there. See www.nytimes.com/library/africa

¹²² Bringing its troops home from the DRC could increase Rwanda's problems. The army of 30,000 to 40,000 is undisciplined, corruption has been rife, and it has mostly been used to gain control over diamond-producing areas. Given the instability that would result from the force's return, it is likely that Rwanda will leave the force in the DRC in an attempt to abandon it (Copley, 1999, pp. 6-8).

to call it “the UN’s Vietnam.” As the UN considers embarking upon its second peace operation in the Congo, what do initial observations about the level of consent and condition of the mandate tell us about the probability for success?

Consent

The complex interplay of parties and their motives make consent a difficult goal. The parties fighting Kabila’s DRC Government include the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which consists of two factions, the RCD-Kisangani and RCD-Goma, both traditionally supported by Uganda. RCD-Kisangani recently divided into two when the former (and ousted) leader of the faction, Ernese Wamba dia Wamba, announced a new organization, the Movement for Security, Peace, and Development (MSPD), which is supported by Rwanda. The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) is another important rebel group. In addition to supporting anti-government rebels, Rwanda and Uganda have deployed their own troops to attack Kabila’s government.¹²³

Kabila’s DRC Government also does not lack support. Mr. Kabila has allied himself with tens of thousands of Interahamwe, and formed a loose alliance with the indigenous warriors known as the Mayi-Mayi, who believe that water has magical qualities that protect them from bullets. The DRC Government also receives help from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

¹²³ Fisher and Onishi (2000) state that many argue that the war in Congo is really three wars, saying, “The first is the battle between Mr. Kabila and the Congolese rebels fighting to overthrow him. The second war is an ethnic war in the eastern provinces of Congo, primarily against ethnic Congolese Tutsi. The third war—really a series of conflicts—involves all the outside countries: Rwanda and Uganda on the side of the rebels; Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on the side of Mr. Kabila” Available: <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/Africa/O2O600africa-congo.html>

The motives of the various parties are driven by self-interest. For Rwanda, the key is the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry that has kept Rwanda in convulsions for years. The Tutsi-led government of Rwanda is there to curb the Hutu militia.¹²⁴ Uganda initially joined in the fray to support Rwanda and to curb its own rebels based in Congo. However, now that Uganda and Rwanda support different rebel factions within the RCD, they are quarrelling between themselves. On the other hand, Angola needs Mr. Kabila to fight its own UNITA rebels, based in southern Congo, and Namibia is there to help Angola. Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe, has come to Mr. Kabila's aid due to his ambition to become a regional power. Yet for all parties, the lure of Congo's riches of timber, gold, diamonds, and metals is an overriding motive to continue the conflict for as long as possible.

The parties to the conflict in the Congo have often met and signed peace agreements only to continue fighting without so much as a pause.¹²⁵ After the outbreak of the war in July 1998, several agreements were announced and quickly ignored. After another of these false promises, a New York Times reporter remarked, "Despite the official announcement on Monday night [September 4] of a ceasefire agreement in Congo, the latest peace negotiations ended today much like the others in recent weeks — with nothing more than a joint statement endorsing peace as an ultimate goal" (Daley, 1998, A-9).

¹²⁴ Burundi has also sent forces into Congo to fight Hutu rebels of its own.

¹²⁵ Page 3 of the Lusaka Agreement mentions the previous attempts to find peace at Victoria Falls I and II, Pretoria, Durban, Port Louis, Nairobi, Windhoek, Dodoma and the Lusaka and Gaborone Ministerial peace efforts. The Second Victoria Falls Summit was held from 7 to 8 September 1998, and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities. Also mentioned are UN Resolution 1234 of 9 April 1999 in which the conflict was labeled a threat to peace, security and stability in the region, and the Peace Agreement signed on 18 April, 1999 at Sirte, Libya.

Even after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 there were numerous breaches of the ceasefire and continuing military preparations in the DRC. A number of diplomatic efforts were made to institute the Lusaka Agreement's ceasefire provisions, including a meeting in late January 2000 of seven African presidents at the UN for a special Security Council session convened by Richard C. Holbrooke. Nothing was accomplished beyond reasserting the goals of the agreement.

By February 2000, fighting had intensified in numerous locations. The UN Permanent Representatives of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda each wrote to the Security Council President during March 2000 regarding allegations of violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Yet even during this diplomatic effort, a rebel group in cooperation with Rwanda's troops mounted an even larger offensive against Kabila's government.

On March 28, Under Secretary-General Miyet, head of the UN peacekeeping department, informed the Council that Congo's President Kabila had imposed unacceptable restrictions on peace operations troops.¹²⁶ There was also a lack of progress in the Congolese national dialogue called for in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement as President Kabila refused to allow the dialogue facilitator to travel outside Kinshasa.¹²⁷

Noting the increasing number of military incidents, the Secretary-General suggested on 18 April that they were "apparently in connection with well planned and organized military

¹²⁶ Available: www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/O32900congo-un.html

¹²⁷ The Secretary-General (S/2000/330) stated, "The inter-Congolese dialogue is a critical component of the effort to facilitate a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The facilitator needs the full cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the relevant Congolese parties in the task assigned to him."

action aimed at strategic objectives" (S/2000/330). He also suggested that arms purchases and troop training by the parties might suggest they may be getting ready for new military actions, stating "These developments have raised questions about the commitment of the parties to the cease fire."

As it began to appear that the parties' failure to implement the Lusaka Agreement ceasefire provisions might completely derail MONUC, they signed a plan on 8 April 2000 for a total cessation of hostilities and disengagement of forces to begin 14 April. The plan called for all parties to provide a secure environment in areas under their control and to facilitate UN access and free movement. It also comprised a timetable for important events. On 8 April, the parties issued ceasefire orders to their military commanders.

In what may be an indicator of the durability of the 14 April ceasefire, Rwanda and Uganda resumed their sporadic conflict over Kisangani on 9 May, with each side accusing the other of initiating a renewed round of shelling. On May 16, the two sides reached another agreement to withdraw from the city. Also, heavy fighting was reported on May 13 in the northern province of Equateur between the Congolese government forces and the rebel Forces of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), which is backed by Uganda. The rebel forces occupied one city and were attacking another, while government communications had been cut.¹²⁸

The assessment of the level of consent for MONUC is derived from measurements of the observance by all parties of cease-fire provisions, the number of actor attacks against opponents or peace operation troops, and the number of actor actions that might threaten

¹²⁸ See cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa, 14 May 2000, for details.

opponents or peace operation troops (such as troop build-ups or other threatening behavior).

The parties must extend consent for the entire operation. Each of these indicators will be considered as contributing equally, and the level of consent is rated either a 1 = low, 2 = medium, or 3 = high.

It is clear that the parties to the conflict have not observed past cease-fire provisions and have continued threatening actions and actual attacks against opponents. The parties violated the ceasefire provisions of the Lusaka Agreement from the moment it was signed. Numerous attempts to implement an alternate ceasefire failed until the parties signed a new ceasefire plan on 8 April. While this plan has largely held, fighting between Uganda and Rwanda over Kisangani and renewed fighting in the north still indicate a low level of consent that will be coded as 1.

Mandate

As the foundation for the mandate for MONUC, the Lusaka Agreement is an unclear guide to peace.¹²⁹ Part I of the Agreement calls for a cessation of hostilities, release of political and military prisoners, disengagement of forces, a program of national dialogue, disarming of militias, and measures to address the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbors. It also calls for a Joint Military Commission (JMC) responsible for executing the peace operation until arrival of the UN, and asks the UN to establish a peace operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These are all important matters that an effective agreement must address; implementation details are in Annex A.

Unfortunately Annex A does not clearly outline the modalities for the agreement's

¹²⁹ The Lusaka Agreement is available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monucD.htm>

implementation. Procedures are very sketchy at best, and the annex often defers potentially serious problems to later negotiations.¹³⁰ For example, the plan outlining withdrawal of foreign forces is covered in two sentences, one of which simply refers to the calendar of events in Annex B. Chapter 10, “Formation of a National Army,” consists of a single sentence resolving that a mechanism will later be determined by inter-Congolese political negotiations. Annex B’s implementation calendar is vague and overly optimistic. For example, it calls for the formal ceasefire to begin only 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement.

As noted above, the Agreement specifies a draft mandate for the UN that includes both peacekeeping and peace enforcement duties. The peacekeeping duties are specific and practical, with the exception of directing the operation to “take necessary measures to ensure compliance” with the agreement. This stipulation is clearly beyond the capacity of a peacekeeping operation to fulfill.

Peace enforcement tasking is far less feasible. It includes tracking down and disarming armed groups; screening mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; handing over those who committed genocide to the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda; and working out persuasive or coercive measures as appropriate for disarming, assembling, repatriation and reintegration into society of members of the armed groups. These tasks lie far beyond the capability of any peace operation not specifically tailored for extensive peace enforcement.

¹³⁰ This vagueness is reminiscent of UNOMIL in Liberia, where Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin (1999) found that, “In the Cotonou Agreement, with a wave of the negotiators’ ‘magic wand,’ factions would become disarmed, displaced populations resettled, voters registered, and elections held” (p. 58).

The Secretary-General made note of the agreement's inclusion of a draft mandate and its call for peace enforcement in his 15 July 1999 Report (S/1999/790). The Secretary-General recommended initial deployment of a small force to report on conditions in the DRC, with a potential force of 500 observers protected by a security force of undetermined size to follow. He also recommended that deployment of the follow-on force not occur until the consent of the parties was assured—a very innovative "trip wire" meant to force the parties to demonstrate their own dedication prior to any large scale commitment by the UN.¹³¹

The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1258 (1999) on 6 August 1999 authorizing the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison personnel to confirm adherence to the guarantees of cooperation and assurances of security from the parties. In November, the Council further clarified the role of the UN in Resolution 1289 (1999) by creating MONUC and placing all UN personnel already in the Congo under it. Resolution 1289 (1999) also affirmed the Secretary-General's call for additional deployments to be contingent upon the demonstrated consent of the parties.

In his 17 January 2000 Report, the Secretary-General noted that the first phase of the UN operation, the deployment of the 90-man assessment force, was mostly complete. He also noted that the military and security situation had worsened in the Congo, with continued fighting by the Interahamwe, Burundian rebels, and Mayi-Mayi rebel groups, as well as Congolese, Namibian, Zimbabwean, and Rwandan government troops. He recommended that

¹³¹ Deployment of a smaller force before complete deployment is not unusual. In Cambodia, UNAMIC performed a similar role for UNTAC. However, it is unusual to make deployment of the main force contingent upon the Secretary-General's assessment of the security environment and level of consent.

if phase two were to deploy, it should have a force of 5,537 personnel, and he dismissed peace enforcement activities for MONUC.

Affirming the contents of the Secretary-General's 17 January report, the Security Council passed Resolution 1291 on 24 February 2000 by authorizing up to 5,537 troops, including 500 observers. The Council confirmed that the second deployment phase would only be carried out if the Secretary-General determined that MONUC would be able to deploy and work with adequate security and the cooperation of the parties.¹³²

The evaluation of the mandate for MONUC considers the number of UN mandates issued (a high number may reflect poor mandate construction and would at best complicate a force commander's job), whether an agreement between the parties existed prior to the authorization of the operation, and whether realizable objectives are outlined in the mandate. The assessment will include any peace settlements or Secretary-General's reports that directly bear upon the UN resolution. Each of these indicators will be considered as contributing equally, and the level of consent will be rated either a 1 = low, 2 = medium, or 3 = high.

The Security Council passed only three resolutions specifically authorizing MONUC; Resolution 1258 (1999), Resolution 1289 (1999), and Resolution 1291(2000). This is not a high number of resolutions, and in any case, the goals outlined in the mandates did not shift, as each resolution simply built upon the other. Fortunately, the Secretary-General and the

¹³² Resolution 1291 (2000) authorized MONUC to act under chapter VII only to take necessary action to protect UN and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

Council excised those objectives proposed in the Lusaka Agreement that were simply not attainable. The remaining objectives outlined were realizable.

The mandate is measured as medium and coded a "2." Even though the Lusaka Agreement did exist prior to UN authorization of the operation, it was less than ideal. It identified most of the important concerns, but it was too vague in many places to provide much guidance. The Secretary-General did not increase the level of detail in his reports; nor did the Security Council in its resolutions. Of particular concern are the objectives outlined in the Lusaka Agreement; those concerning peace enforcement were unrealizable. Although the UN wisely expunged the requirements related to peace enforcement, this may well lead to differing expectations on the part of the parties.

Prognosis

Consent measured a "low" rating and scored a 1, while mandate measured as medium and scored a 2. Referring to Table 7, a score of 1 for consent and 2 for mandate indicate a predicted success score of 1.31738 where 1 is a failure, 2 is a moderate success, and 3 is a complete success.

Table 7:
Predicted Success Levels as a Function of Consent/Mandate

Consent	Mandate	Predicted Success
1	1	1.09455
*1	*2	*1.31738
1	3	1.54021
2	1	1.31738
2	2	1.76304
2	3	2.20870
3	1	1.54021
3	2	2.20870
3	3	2.87719

Since a predicted score of 1.31738 is equivalent to failure, only with a change in initial conditions should the Secretary-General consider deploying the full MONUC contingent in the DRC. Specifically, the parties must demonstrate their consent to MONUC. Given a change in level of consent from 1 to 3, a predicted score of 2.20870 suggests that at least a partial success would be probable. Additionally, the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement outlining the modalities of implementation must be amended by side agreements that are more specific and conclusive, supplemented with a realistic calendar of events.

Conclusion

As of 30 May 2000, 100 support staff and 500 military observers have been deployed to Congo. The remainder of the 5,537 troops approved by the Security Council in Resolution

1291 (2000) is awaiting the Secretary-General's confirmation of the parties' full consent.¹³³

The means given MONUC by the Security Council in its mandate have been criticized as too meager. The sheer size and terrain of Congo, with its thick jungle cover, poor communications, and impassable roads have led to calls for a much more robust force. Jakkie Potgieter, senior researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies in South Africa, stated, "It's totally inadequate" (Fisher and Onishi, 2000). Even Rwanda's UN envoy, Joseph W. Mutaboba, said that 5,000 troops was "a meaningless number" for a country the size of Congo (Crossette, 2000).¹³⁴ Yet geography, command and control, and force size are all insignificant variables in determining the probability of success. Potgieter and Mutaboba's efforts would be better rewarded if they sought an increased level of consent rather than an increase in force size.

The inclusion of a consent "trip wire" in MONUC's deployment demonstrates the role the consent*mandate model can play for policymakers as the Security Council insists upon appropriate initial conditions. The Secretary-General's decision on deployment will be very

¹³³ The UN Security Council Mission that traveled to the Congo 4-8 May 2000 recommended in their report that before the Secretary-General makes his final decision on deployment of phase II of MONUC, he should speak to each of the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire to gain "their unequivocal commitment to assist the proposed deployment, testing their commitment to the maintenance of the 8 April ceasefire agreed in Kampala, and asking for their firm undertaking to support phase II on the ground in every way possible" (p. 9). Report available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/mission.pdf>.

¹³⁴ In a 17 May 2000 Security Council meeting to discuss the Council's mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (document S/2000/416), Canada's Representative, Mr. Fowler, stated he was "concerned that MONUC did not have enough capacity to achieve even the core elements of its mandate. The resolution authorizing phase II of MONUC fell short of matching the mission's mandate with the resources needed for it to succeed." See Security Council Press Release SC/6862, available: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/>.

complex.¹³⁵ Yet recognition of the role of consent makes it possible to avoid deploying another peace operation into an untenable situation.

¹³⁵ This point is made incisively by the Report on the Council's Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2000/416, p. 9).

VIII. Conclusion

My goal was to develop a theory that identified the factors associated with successful peace operations. Toward that end, I employed an effective definition of success and isolated the variables that the literature identified as especially important. I formed hypotheses about the relationship between these variables and the probability of success of peace operations, then subjected the hypotheses to an empirical test. Even though the analysis shows that the hypothesized relationships between the independent variables and dependent variable are in the proper direction, it is surprising to see that many independent variables have no statistically significant effect. No other variable or combination of variables match the consent*mandate model in influencing success.

The results were then applied to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to predict its outcome. As a consequence of a low level of consent and a medium quality of mandate, the probability is that the UN operation will fail if it deploys into the initial conditions currently existing. Demonstrated improvements in the level of consent by all parties as well as improvements in the mandate are needed before a higher probability of success is likely. Fortunately, the UN Security Council in conjunction with the Secretary-General demanded that the mandate for the Congo require confirmed consent prior to complete deployment of the peace operation. Requiring proven consent as a prerequisite recognizes the role consent plays in the outcome and is an effective way to dramatically increase the probability of success.

The results of my study have significant implications for the scholarly literature covering peace operations. The literature is consistently vague and unsystematic, a

consequence of speculation by scholars about what variables are critical to success without the benefit of hypothesis testing. My study subjected the body of literature to empirical testing to provide precision, rigor and focus to the debate.

Scholarly literature often cites consent as the single most important variable leading to a successful peace operation (Berdal, 1993; Durch, 1993b; Dobbie, 1994; Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Kaufman, 1996; Bratt, 1997; Jett, 1999). Wiseman (1983) and Liu (1992) add that the level of consent of non-state parties (such as internal factions, liberation movements, and irregular armed elements) is as important as that of states. Grünigen (in Cassese, 1978) further defines consent, stating that it must be assured for the whole duration of the operation. I hypothesized consent as the most important variable influencing success, and operationalized it by measuring compliance of all parties with any ceasefires and the cooperation of all parties for the duration of the operation. My empirical study verifies consent as the most important influence upon success, confirming my hypothesis and the scholarly literature.

The next factor many analysts suggest as a major influence on success is the type of conflict (Diehl, 1994; Weiss, 1995; Skjelsbaek, 1989; Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Liu, 1992; Berdal, 1993; King, 1997). I used existing data from Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b) to test the relationship between conflict type and success. They define civil conflicts as those within one state involving one or no state actors, interstate conflicts as those with only states as disputants, and internationalized civil as those including state actors and subnational actors as disputants. I hypothesized that the potential for success in peace operations will be lowest in internationalized intrastate conflict, improve in intrastate conflict, and be highest in interstate conflicts.

My finding that the consent*mandate model explains success more completely than

type of conflict is provocative. Just like peace operations in interstate wars, peace operations in internationalized intrastate conflict and intrastate conflict are successful if they enjoy a high level of consent and a useful mandate, a finding with significant impact for scholars advocating type of conflict as the primary influence upon success.

Geographic considerations are also often argued to be important to the success of a peace operation (Diehl, 1994; Skjelsbaek, 1989; Skjelsbaek, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990). Kaufman (1996) disagrees, suggesting it is really consent, not geography that matters (p. 243). I agreed with Kaufman that consent is more important, but asserted geography did matter. I hypothesized that the potential for success in peace operations would be lowest where landmasses are large, terrain is mountainous, the area is densely populated, and the number of state borders is high. I again used existing data from Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b), and found that none of the geographic factors proved significant. Kaufman's assessment is accurate, bringing into question the scholarly literature claiming its importance.

Impartiality is often cited as an important contributor to success in peace operations (Urquhart, in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Wiseman in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990; Ratner, 1995; Mackinlay, in Weiss, 1995; Dobbie, 1994; Kaufman, 1996). In fact, Skjelsbaek (in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990) suggests impartiality is "the most important rule in peacekeeping" (p. 65). While I disagree with Skjelsbaek (in Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990) that impartiality outweighed all other factors, I did hypothesize that impartiality was important to success. Yet impartiality was not significant in the presence of the consent*mandate model. Scholars advocating impartiality, especially those who find it more important than any other variable, must reconsider its importance.

Many researchers suggest that effective command and control arrangements are important to peace operation success (Durch, 1993b; Diehl, 1994; Alberts & Hayes, 1995; Murray, in Wiseman, 1983). A number point to the tendency of national contingents making up UN multi-national coalitions to turn to their government for guidance as reason for finding command and control a major problem (Alberts & Hayes, 1995; Durch, 1993b; Berdal, 1996; Zacarias, 1996; Mackinlay, in Weiss, 1995; Findlay, 1996). Yet there are those who believe that while command and control difficulties can dampen efficiency, it has little or no influence upon outcome (Diehl, 1994; Allen, 1996). I believed command and control would influence outcome, and hypothesized that the probability of success would increase as the effectiveness of command and control increased. My empirical analysis found command and control an insignificant factor, refuting both my hypothesis and those scholars suggesting its importance.

The size of the military force supporting the peace operation garners attention from scholars as a factor influencing the success of peace operations (Skjelsbaek, 1989; Green, Kahl, & Diehl, 1998b). Anticipating that force size would influence the level of success of peace operations, I hypothesized that the probability of success in peace operations would increase as force size increased. I used existing data from Green, Kahl, and Diehl (1998a/b), who measured the maximum number of troops deployed for each operation, to test my hypothesis. As with command and control, the results of my empirical analysis were counter to my hypothesis and the literature, finding force size to be insignificant.

UN mandates often receive attention as a variable influencing the success of peace operations (Murray, in Wiseman, 1983; Durch, 1993b; Berdal, 1993; Diehl, 1994; Zacarias, 1996). Scholars suggest that a clear and detailed mandate with concise goals and duties will make an important contribution toward success. Conversely, others propose that mandate

ambiguity may actually increase the probability of success by allowing military commanders discretion and freedom in how to conduct their operations (Durch, 1993b).

I disagreed with the point of view that mandate ambiguity would increase the probability of success, and hypothesized that clear, concise mandates would increase success while vague, ambiguous mandates would not. Empirical testing proved the significance of a clear and concise mandate in increasing the probability of success, confirming my hypothesis and the majority of the scholarly literature.

Finally, the involvement of the great powers, defined by me as the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the P-5), is often cited as an important influence upon peace operation success (Lee, Paginhardt, & Stanley, 1992; Durch, 1993b; Diehl, 1994; Bratt, 1997; Green, Kahl, & Diehl, 1998a/b). I operationalized great power support by modifying indicators suggested by Haas (1983) to fit my study. I hypothesized that high levels of great power support would increase successful outcomes, yet the results of my study indicated that great power support was not significant in influencing the probability of an operation's success.

My long-range goal in developing a theory of peace operations was to structure a theoretical base for additional research. My analysis suggests additional research into several areas will help refine and strengthen the theoretical base. Accordingly, I propose several lines of inquiry that may be fruitful for future research regarding factors influencing success.

My study clearly indicates that deploying any peace operation, including peace enforcement, in an environment without consent greatly reduces its probability of success. By extension, in situations without consent either peacekeeping or peace enforcement is likely to fail, and deployment of a peace operation should be contingent upon consent. Yet most

scholars suggest that abstention from conflicts involving human rights violations is impossible for the international community (Skjelsbaek, 1989; James, 1995; McClure and Orlov, 1999; Hunt, 1994; Jentleson, quoted in Whitelaw, 1999). If deployment of a peace operation should be contingent upon consent, how should the international community respond when human rights are being violated but consent is not forthcoming?

Perhaps the answer lies in who conducts the peace operation. My study limited its case survey to those peace operations authorized and commanded by the UN. Yet many scholars suggest that the UN should leave peace enforcement to others (Jett, 1999; Diehl, 1994; Allen, 1996). In fact, recent peace enforcement operations have not been authorized or commanded by the UN (Operation Allied Force in Kosovo) or were authorized but not commanded by the UN (INTERFET in East Timor). An empirical study comparing these non-UN operations to UN operations would allow evaluation of the levels of consent and success to determine if non-UN operations are more successful with lower levels of consent than UN operations.

Another key issue that must be addressed is my finding that the significance of the type of conflict was outweighed by the consent*mandate model. I argued that type of conflict would have a significant influence upon success, an argument well supported by scholarly literature. Yet perhaps other theories offer a better account of success than type of conflict. Some (Cottam & Cottam, 2000) argue that theories of group identity and conflict that focus on the effect of direct competition between social groups may well be more important.

The impact of identity groups on a state's relations with other states and on its own internal conflicts differs between nation-states and non-nation states. Operationalizing these differences (Cottam & Cottam distinguish core community non-nation states, multi-ethnic

states, and multinational states) could provide a useful framework for generalized analysis.¹³⁶ It is intuitive that the identity group interaction would affect the ability of a peace operation to resolve conflict. This theory has obvious applicability to past operations in states such as Bosnia and Rwanda. Analysis of their role there might provide lessons about group identity and their influence before beginning new operations such as that in the Congo.

Another area ripe for additional research is the continuing role of the great powers after an operation is authorized. For political or other reasons, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) may demonstrate great power support by authorizing a peace operation, but subsequently support one or another of the parties in the conflict, impeding the potential success of the mission. Following Haas (1983), I operationalized great power support based upon the voting by the P-5 when authorizing an operation; future research should include evaluating the continuing role of great power support after authorization.

The empirical analysis I have performed in this study moves much of the discussion on peace operations from the plethora of isolated case studies into a theoretical framework that can guide further research and policy. My theoretical approach allows scholars investigating peace operations to structure their own research, but it also gives direction as to how to frame contemporary debates, resolve existing controversies, and pinpoint questions that are important to ask. I believe that this is an essential step to bring coherence, rigor, and significance to scholarly studies on peace operations.

¹³⁶ Cottam & Cottam's (2000) core community non-nation states are states with one identity group that sees itself as constituting the community upon which a nation should be based; multi-ethnic states are those that do not have a single group that considers itself the rightful national community and primary identity and loyalty goes to ethnic groups; and multinational states are composed of identity groups that are powerful enough to form their own states.

IX. References

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X. Appendices

Appendix A: United Nations Peace Operations, 1945 – 2000

#	Period	MISSION	LOCATION	START	END	Status
Traditional						
1		UNTSO	Middle East	1948	Ongoing	Failure
2		UNMOGIP	India and Pakistan	1949	Ongoing	Failure
3		UNEF I	Middle East	1956	1967	Moderate
4		UNOGIL	Middle East	1958	1958	Failure
5		ONUC	Congo	1960	1964	Failure
6		UNSF	West New Guinea (West Irian)	1962	1963	Complete
7		UNYOM	Yemen	1963	1964	Failure
8		UNFICYP	Cyprus	1964	Ongoing	Moderate
9		DOMREP	Dominican Republic	1965	1966	Complete
10		UNIPOM	India-Pakistan	1965	1966	Moderate
11		UNEF II	Middle East	1973	1979	Complete
12		UNDOF	Middle East	1974	Ongoing	Moderate
13		UNIFIL	Middle East	1978	Ongoing	Failure
Transition						
14		UNGOMAP	Afghanistan and Pakistan	1988	1990	Moderate
15		UNIIMOG	Iran-Iraq	1988	1991	Moderate
16		UNAVEM I	Angola	1989	1991	Complete
17		UNTAG	Namibia-Angola	1989	1990	Complete
18		ONUCA	Central America	1989	1992	Complete
New Era						
19		MINURSO	Western Sahara	1991	Ongoing	Failure
20		UNIKOM	Iraq-Kuwait	1991	Ongoing	Moderate
21		UNAVEM II	Angola	1991	1995	Failure
22		ONUSAL	El Salvador	1991	1995	Complete
23		UNAMIC	Cambodia	1991	1992	Failure
24		UNTAC	Cambodia	1992	1993	Moderate
25		UNPROFOR	Former Yugoslavia	1992	1995	Failure
26		UNOSOM I	Somalia	1992	1993	Failure
27		ONUMOZ	Mozambique	1992	1994	Complete
28		UNOSOM II	Somalia	1993	1995	Failure
29		UNOMUR	Uganda-Rwanda	1993	1994	Failure
30		UNOMIG	Georgia	1993	Ongoing	Failure
31		UNOMIL	Liberia	1993	1997	Failure
32		UNMIH	Haiti	1993	1996	Failure
33		UNAMIR	Rwanda	1993	1996	Failure
34		UNASOG	Aouzou Strip (Chad)	1994	1994	Complete
35		UNMOT	Tajikistan	1994	Ongoing	Failure

Appendix A:
United Nations Peace Operations, 1945 – 2000. (continued)

Retraction						
36	UNAVEM	Angola	1995	1997	Failure	
37	UNCRO	Croatia	1995	1996	Failure	
38	UNPREDEP	Macedonia	1995	1999	Complete	
39	UNMIBH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995	Ongoing	Failure	
40	UNMOP	Croatia	1996	Ongoing	Moderate	
41	UNTAES	E. Slavonia, Baranja & W. Sirmium	1996	1998	Complete	
42	UNSMIH	Haiti	1996	1997	Failure	
43	MINUGUA	Guatemala	1997	1997	Complete	
44	MONUA	Angola	1997	1999	Failure	
45	UNTMIH	Haiti	1997	1997	Failure	
46	MIPONUH	Haiti	1997	2000	Failure	
Resurgence						
47	UNPSG	Croatia	1998	1998	Undetermined	
48	MINURCA	Central African Republic	1998	Ongoing	Undetermined	
49	UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	1998	Ongoing	Undetermined	
50	UNMIK	Kosovo	1999	Ongoing	Undetermined	
51	UNTAET	East Timor	1999	Ongoing	Undetermined	
52	MONUC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999	Ongoing	Undetermined	

Appendix B:
Variable Key

Variable	Definition
Obs	Observation Number
MISSION	Mission Acronym
CONTYPE	Type of Conflict
LOCTYPE	Type of Location
ADDLOC	Additional Locations
IMPART	Impartiality
C_C	Command and Control
CONSENT	Consent of Parties
MAND	Mandate Quality
GPSPT	Great Power Support
SUCCESS	Success of the Operation
AREA	Total Area
BORDERS	Number of Borders
FORSIZE	Force Size

Appendix C:
Raw Data

OBS	MISSION	CONTYPE	LOCTYPE	ADDLOC	IMPART	C_C	CONSENT	MAND	GPSPT	SUCCESS	AREA	BORDERS	FORSIZE
1	UNTSO	2	3	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	2
2	UNMOGIP	2	3	1	3	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1
3	UNEFI	2	3	1	3	2	1	2	1	1	3	3	3
4	UNOGIL	3	3	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
5	ONUC	3	2	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	3
6	UNSF	3	3	0	0	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	2
7	UNYOM	3	3	0	0	3	1	1	3	1	2	2	1
8	UNHICYP	3	4	0	2	3	1	1	4	2	1	1	1
9	UNIPOM	2	2	0	0	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
10	DOMREP	3	1	0	0	2	•	1	3	4	3	1	1
11	UNEFII	2	3	0	0	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	3
12	UNDOF	3	2	0	0	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	2
13	UNIFIL	3	2	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
14	UNGOMAP	3	3	1	0	3	3	2	4	2	1	1	1
15	UNIMOG	2	3	0	0	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3
16	UNAVEM I	3	1	0	0	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3
17	UNTAG	3	2	0	0	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2
18	ONUCA	2	3	1	0	3	3	2	4	3	3	3	2
19	UNIKOM	2	3	0	0	3	3	2	4	1	1	1	2
20	UNAVEM II	3	2	0	0	3	3	1	4	1	3	3	2
21	ONUSAL	1	3	0	0	3	3	2	4	3	2	2	2
22	MINURSO	3	3	0	0	3	3	2	4	1	3	2	2
23	UNAMIC	3	3	0	2	3	1	1	4	1	1	1	2
24	UNPROFOR	3	3	1	0	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	3
25	UNTAC	3	3	0	0	2	1	1	4	2	1	1	2
26	UNOSOM I	1	1	1	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	1
27	UNOMOZ	3	3	0	2	3	1	1	4	1	1	1	3
28	UNOSOM II	1	1	1	0	3	1	1	4	1	1	1	3
29	UNOMUR	1	2	0	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	2
30	UNOMIG	3	3	0	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	2
31	UNOMIL	3	2	0	0	3	3	1	4	1	1	1	3
32	UNMIAH	1	3	0	0	3	3	1	4	1	1	1	3
33	UNAMIR	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	3
34	UNSOG	3	3	0	0	3	3	1	4	1	1	1	2
35	UNMOT	3	3	0	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	3
36	UNAVEM III	3	2	0	0	2	3	1	3	4	1	1	4
37	UNCRO	3	2	0	1	3	3	1	4	1	1	1	3
38	UNPREDEP	3	3	0	0	3	3	3	2	4	1	1	2
39	UNMIBH	3	2	1	0	2	3	1	3	4	1	1	3
40	UNMOP	3	2	0	0	3	3	1	3	4	1	1	2
41	UNTAES	3	2	0	0	3	3	1	4	1	1	1	3
42	UNSMIH	1	3	0	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	2
43	MINUGUA	1	3	1	0	2	3	1	3	4	1	1	3
44	MONUA	3	2	0	0	3	3	1	4	1	1	1	2
45	UNTMIH	1	3	0	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	2
46	MIPONUH	3	3	0	0	2	3	1	4	1	1	1	2